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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis is a study that chronicles Penn South’s history of affordability and 
social responsibility, and offers possible strategies and partners for maintaining 
affordability through preservation. A majority of the thesis is devoted to the various 
financing methods that the Mutual Redevelopment Houses, Inc. Board undertook, and 
the various strategies that helped the cooperative to remain affordable. It also deals 
with the multitude of misadventures with equipment, labor, and etc. that caused the 
project to run over budget.  With collaboration between Penn South’s tenants, 
administration, creditors, and the New York City government, though, the cooperative 
has been able to provide over 2,800 affordable units for over fifty years.  Lastly, the 
thesis seeks to offer possible partners and methods of retaining affordability. The 
majority of this thesis’ data was gathered from the Kheel Archives at Cornell 
University, which houses a spectrum of garment union documents and 
correspondence. Other information was gathered directly from Penn South 
administrators or from secondary affordable housing and preservation sources, 
particularly sources that dealt with New York City and New York State. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although preservation has been implicated in cases of white, middle class 
gentrification of minority neighborhoods, affordability and preservation have never 
been inherently at odds.  Preservationists have long argued that preservation can serve 
as a tool for non-profits focused on providing affordable housing as well as wealthy 
individuals and large corporations. Adversaries of preservation such as the Real 
Estate Board of New York (REBNY), though, commonly assert that preservation does 
little in the way of protecting or generating affordability. The Board errs by ignoring 
affordable housing projects, like the First Houses in East Village, which has used 
preservation as tool for affordability. Preservation can provide and protect affordable 
housing stock, and this study's subject, Penn South, has not only the community but 
also the necessary foundation to be such a success story. This thesis is, at its core, a 
study that chronicles Penn South’s history of affordability and social responsibility. It 
also offers possible strategies and partners for maintaining affordability through 
preservation. 
Of all the cooperatives built by the garment unions in New York City, Penn 
South is one of a handful of that has remained true to its original vision of affordable 
housing for low to mid-income inhabitants.  Even though Penn South has faced 
multiple financial difficulties, from the increase in its original budget to the inflation 
of real estate taxes, it has fought successfully to retain its status as an affordable 
housing project through continual work within the Chelsea community and with the 
city.  The majority of this thesis is based on personal accounts gathered from letters, 
interviews, and other primary sources with the rest referring to a wide base of 
literature published by scholars, architects, and non-profits. Affordability depends 
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on a multitude of factors, including complex questions and definitions that this study 
will sidestep.  It will solely deal with the incomes of tenants living within Penn South 
and the immediate surrounding areas, utilizing other housing price examples solely 
for comparison. 
The preservation movement, for the past several decades, has focused on 
economic incentives.  Advocates point out that preservation can reduce the cost of a 
project or increase the value of an area, both measurable effects.  Preservationists’ 
ability to point to benefits such as increased property values and tax receipts helps 
from both the public and private perspective.  Presenting preservation from an 
economic standpoint has served the preservation movement well, but looking at 
preservation from this economic perspective can also highlight preservation’s 
negative role in the process of gentrification.  This thesis is a historic analysis of the 
Penn South, undertaken to present it’s potential for historic designation, opening up 
possible avenues of funding to support the cooperative’s affordability.   
To understand the cooperative’s role as affordable housing it was necessary to 
review reports from the Penn South executive board, which contained contracts with 
the city relating to income caps, rents, carrying charge increases, and project costs, 
this information was collected by combing through union archival papers. Directories 
of cooperative housing, studies on affordability, and books cataloguing the history of 
housing in New York City and urban renewal were obtained through the Cornell 
Library system from other universities including Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and 
University of California Los Angeles.  The latter part of this thesis, Chapter Five, 
focused on the cooperative’s potential partners and funding, and relied on a variety of 
sources, including an interview with Walter Mankoff, Penn South’s treasurer, 
information provided by employees of New York City’s Housing Authority, 
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newspaper articles, and studies done on affordable housing in New York.  The 
majority of this material was gathered in New York City while the author worked 
with the Design Trust for Public Space in the fall of 2012.  The interview with Mr. 
Mankoff took place at Penn South, while the presentation by the NYCHA employees 
occurred in Queens.  The archival materials were obtained from the Kheel Archives at 
Cornell University in Ithaca.  
The thesis is divided into five chapters.  The first four chapters chronicle 
different aspects of the cooperative’s history and Chapter Five offers strategies for 
potential partners and funding strategies.  The first chapter deals with the history of 
New York City’s affordable housing, chronicling the struggle and the various 
attempts that were made by both the government and private citizens to improve the 
affordable housing stock.  It segues into the history of union and its role in financing 
affordable housing.  It highlights the construction of cooperatives that led to the 
creation of Penn South.   
The second, third, and fourth chapters focus on issues of financing, 
construction, maintenance, and the ways in which the board and community members 
addressed issues within the cooperative. The second chapter focuses mainly on 
problems that arose in the organization and construction of the Penn South 
cooperative, ending with Penn South’s dedication.  The third and largest chapter 
focuses on the financing and affordability complications that the executive board 
faced from the late 1950’s to the early 1980’s.  The fourth chapter examines Penn 
South from mid-1980 to the 1990’s as the management attempted to retain 
affordability through refinancing and through application to the city for tax 
abatements.   
The final chapter deals with Penn South from the 1990’s to present and 
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focuses on possible partners and strategies that can help Penn South remain 
affordable.  The remaining pages summarize reasons for designation and preservation, 
before ultimately outlining why and how historic designation can be positive a 
approach in preserving affordable housing stock.  The conclusion also tackles issues 
that I hope to address in the future.  Ultimately, though, this thesis is an attempt to tell 
the story of the Penn South Cooperative, and its struggle to remain affordable.  
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CHAPTER I: BRIEF HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND 
UNION HOUSING IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 
 Although affordable housing in New York City has always been difficult to 
find, the increase in the influx of immigrants during the mid to late nineteenth century 
led to a shortage of dwellings that were both sanitary and appropriate.  The first wave 
was composed of largely German and Irish immigrants.  The Eastern Europeans and 
Italians, who faced housing discrimination, followed them.1   The boom in population 
encouraged a growth in construction, which often led to the erection of questionable 
housing.  These buildings, called tenements, often housed tens of people per room to 
maximize profit.  They also lacked basic sanitary conditions with little light or air, 
and crude toilet facilities.2  Although building regulations had been established as far 
back as 1625 with the prohibition of wooden chimneys, the corruption of the 
enforcement officials made impossible any widespread regulation of housing.3   It was 
not until 1867 that Manhattan passed the first Tenement House Law, a ruling that was 
inadequate because it only covered buildings with three or more families.4 
In the face of limited governmental action, private citizens and organizations 
undertook the mission of creating affordable and sanitary housing conditions for the 
poor.  Philanthropic groups undertook ownership of individual tenement buildings 
like Gotham Court and attempted to reform them by offering “efficient management 
                                                
1 Ira Rosenwalke, Population History of New York City, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1972), 
57. 
2 Anthony Jackson, A Place Called Home, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976), 7. 
3 Ira S. Robbins and Marian Samith, ed., Directory of Large Scale Rental and Cooperative Housing 
with a Summary of Legislation relating to housing and Urban Renewal in New York City, (New York 
City: Citizen’s Housing and Planning Council of New York, Inc., 1957), 5. 
4 Ibid. 
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and individual concern.”5  The rehabilitation of older tenant buildings to provide 
affordable and sanitary housing stock proved ineffective, and the focus turned to the 
creation of new and improved housing typologies.6  Advocates of affordable housing 
pushed for the creation of new approaches, such as the dumbbell model, which they 
hoped would provide an alternative to tenement buildings and at the same time offer 
sanitary dwellings that could be constructed at an affordable price.  Public support for 
the construction of new, affordable and sanitary dwellings was spurred on by Jacob 
Riis’ documentation of New York City’s slums.  This shift in sentiment from 
rehabilitation to demolition and construction would dominate the planning landscape 
until the 1950’s. 
 Another form of affordable housing that was explored was the cooperative 
model. Cooperatives had sprung up in England after the Rochdale Equitable Pioneers 
Society established the first modern co-operative in 1844. Yet it was not until 1927, 
over eighty years later that the first housing cooperative was built in New York City. 
Designed by Abraham E. Kazan, the cooperative's funding was provided by the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA). Kazan had had a long history 
of operating and working with cooperatives, as previously he was employed 
at “a chain of cooperative groceries to cooperative coal and ice distribution 
to a cooperative hat shop.”7  When, in 1918, Kazan began to work with the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union it occurred to him to create housing 
co-operatives.  The success of this venture led to the establishment of the United 
Housing Federation in 1951. 
 The creation of the Federation was dependent on three pieces of legislation.  
                                                
5 Anthony Jackson, A Place Called Home, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976), 10. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Emma Jacobs, “Amalgamated Housing Cooperative: Cooperative housing built in the 1920's and still 
existing,” Place Matters, Accessed July 9, 2013, http://www.placematters.net/node/995 
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The first was the State Housing Law of 1926. It allowed cities to exempt buildings 
from local taxes for a period of twenty years so that it could lower rents while at the 
same time limiting dividends paid to investors of no more than 6%.  The second piece 
of legislation was the Redevelopment Companies Law passed in 1942, allowing a city 
to condemn distressed property and transfer titles to a redevelopment company and 
exempt local real estate taxes for up to 25 years.8  Finally, the inclusion of Title 1 into 
the federal Housing Act of 1951 permitted the sale of condemned properties to 
redevelopment companies for less than the market value when they would be used for 
housing.9  
 Funding by Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America for the construction 
of new co-operative housing projects was significantly decreased in the early 1950’s 
due to its inability to organize labor capital that migrated both to Southern states and 
abroad. Faced with an unsound and unwilling financial backer, Kazan was forced to 
seek funds from sources outside of the ACWA union.  He turned to David Dubinsky, 
who had concentrated power in the International Ladies Garment Workers Union 
(ILGWU) by simultaneously holding the office of the president and secretary-
treasurer.  
Kazan convinced the ILGWU to fund a large portion of the East River 
Housing Cooperative, or ILGWU Village, and even though Dubinsky had 
reservations about becoming involved in the project, construction was successfully 
completed in 1956.10  With the success of the East River Housing Cooperative, 
Dubinsky, who had major aspirations for the ILGWU, readily agreed to take on the 
lion’s share of funding for the ILGWU Houses or the Penn South Cooperative, as they 
came to be known.  Both sides agreed that the location should be on the lower West 
                                                
8 Ibid 10. 
9 Ibid 11. 
10 Ibid 322. 
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side, close to the garment shops.11   To fund the project, Dubinsky borrowed from the 
pensions of various ILGWU locals, which met with resistance by others in the Union.  
The construction of Penn South meant providing affordable housing in the 
lower west side of Manhattan during a period of urban decay.  The decay was caused 
by several factors, such as the construction of highways after the end of World War II, 
the construction of the suburbs around Manhattan, and the rise of credit and consumer 
wealth, which led to the growth in the middle class and ‘white flight.’  
Penn South as a cooperative owes much of its organization, construction, and 
financing practices to the cooperatives built previously. Their success and 
construction made Penn South not only a possibility, but also more affordable.  
As mentioned earlier, the first union funded housing cooperative to be 
established in New York was Amalgamated Housing Corporation, built in 1927 with 
funding from the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union.  Constructed near Van 
Cordlandt Park in the Bronx. The site consisted of over 50 city lots, and was bought 
for $325,000.”12 The project grew to fourteen hundred units over three years. 
Although originally built to house union members, it was open to the general public. 
The project was financed with the support of the Jewish Daily Forward 
Association, through the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, with a nominal first 
mortgage of $0.05.  The corporation asked that each tenant cooperator pay $50 per 
room to defray the cost of the second mortgage. 13  The Tudor-style walk-up complex 
encloses a well-landscaped courtyard and features a number of social and educational 
buildings, including a day care center, library, classrooms, art studios, and a 
                                                
11 Ibid 352. 
12 Sidney Hillman, “A Successful Experiment: Amalgamated Demonstrates Feasibility of Better 
Housing,” The American Hebrew, (1930), 657. 
13 Sidney Hillman, “A Successful Experiment: Amalgamated Demonstrates Feasibility of Better 
Housing,” The American Hebrew, (1930), 657. 
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community hall.14  The project was also the first union funded housing cooperative 
that involved Herman Jessor, the architect for all the subsequent cooperatives. 
 The second cooperative, called the Amalgamated Dwellings, was built in 
1930.  It was constructed on Grand Street and composed of two hundred thirty six 
apartments.  It was constructed with the help of Lieutenant Governor Herbert 
Lehman, who was directed by Franklin Roosevelt, then Governor of New York, after 
the “success of the Amalgamated development was reported to” him.15  Designed 
with “brickwork and geometries [which] reflect[ed] expressionist work then current 
in Holland, Germany, and Vienna,” the cooperative “received the medal for design 
excellence from the NYC chapter of the AIA in the class of 6-story apartment 
houses.”16 
While the cooperative was a great success, the Great Depression devastated 
further attempts at creating new housing cooperatives.  Due to the rising 
unemployment, job fluctuations and resulting worker migration, the shareholders who 
remained were unable to shoulder steeply priced proportionate charges.17  Overall, the 
new housing cooperatives floundered because the “financial and organizational 
foundations were not strong enough… [and the] good intention and high ideals [could 
not] overcome poor planning, shaky financial or faulty management.”18 
Although construction of housing cooperatives started to pick up in the 
1940’s, post war, private construction slowed as housing needs skyrocketed.  
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 Tony Schuman, Labor and Housing in New York City: Architect Herman Jessor and the Cooperative 
Housing Movement, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Accessed August 20, 2013 
http://urbanomnibus.net/redux/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/LABOR-AND-HOUSING-IN-NEW-
YORK-CITY.pdf, 2. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Hebert J. Levy and Richard Siegler, “Brief History of Cooperative Housing,” National Association of 
Housing Cooperatives, (1986), Accessed August 20, 2013, 
http://www.coophousing.org/uploadedFiles/NAHC_Site/Resources/nahc%20history%20Siegler.PDF, 
15. 
18 Twenty Year of Achievement: The United Housing Foundation, 1970, 7. 
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Professional investors were unwilling to finance commercial apartment buildings 
because of the inflated costs and rent ceiling that remained in place.19 Also, given the 
lack of financial resources and federal insurance of mortgages, consumer-sponsored 
cooperatives had a hard time assembling the money for construction.  To meet the 
need for capital, organizations, unions, and real estate promoters solicited the future 
occupants.20  Using funds from the ACWA union members, the Hillman Houses were 
built.  Construction started in 1947 and concluded in 1950, with the mortgage 
furnished by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for $9,100,000. 
By the 1950’s, construction of union funded housing cooperatives picked up.  
The upswing in construction was mainly due to two factors.  The first was the passage 
of the 1950 Housing Act, which was initiated after “five members of the Senate and 
five members of the House went to Europe to study cooperative housing in the 
Scandinavian countries and the low countries of Europe.”21  The second factor was 
the establishment of the United Housing Federation in 1951, which provided a 
broader sponsorship for cooperative housing.22  This resulted in the construction of 
three new cooperatives between 1950 and 1960, a 300% increase from the last 
decade.  
The first cooperative to be built during this period was the Mutual Housing 
Cooperative in the Bronx.  Completed in 1955 on less than an acre, it was only one 
building but contained over five hundred and seventy-seven rooms rented at $750 per 
room.  The total cost of construction was $1,575, of which $415,350 was member 
equity.  
                                                
19 Hebert J. Levy and Richard Siegler, “Brief History of Cooperative Housing,” National Association of 
Housing Cooperatives, (1986), Accessed August 20, 2013, 
http://www.coophousing.org/uploadedFiles/NAHC_Site/Resources/nahc%20history%20Siegler.PDF, 
16. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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One year later, in 1956, the East River Housing cooperative was constructed.  
It was the first cooperative to be funded by the ILGWU and constructed by a 
redevelopment company after the New York State’s Limited Profit Housing 
Companies legislation was passed in 1955.  It was also the first housing development 
to be composed of more than 5,000 rooms, and the first Title 1 housing project in the 
country.  The site was seven acres with four buildings and 1,672 apartments.  The 
total cost was over $20,000,000, of which $4,556,937 was member equity.  It would 
later be expanded to become part of the Cooperative Village. 
Two years later, the Park Reservoir Housing Corporation was constructed in 
the Bronx.  It was structured as a limited profit housing company, “the first project 
built under New York State’s Limited-Profit Housing Companies Law of 1955… 
[which] established the N.Y.S. Housing Finance Agency [and provided] low-interest 
bond-backed mortgages for limited-dividend housing developers, with authorization 
for municipal tax abatement as well.”23  This would also be the law that Penn South 
used to finance construction.  The cooperative was composed of three buildings, two 
hundred seventy-three apartments, and 1,273 rooms over one and half acres.  The 
total cost of construction was $3,750,000 with $759,375 in member equity. 
The last cooperative built with union financing before Penn South was the 
Seward Park Housing Cooperative.  It was also structured as a redevelopment 
company. Construction was finished in 1961 and included over twelve and a half 
acres with four buildings.  The cost of construction was $24,000,000 with member 
equity in the amount of $4,786,400.  It was the last cooperative to be built by the UHF 
that housed less than 2,000 apartments. 
                                                
23 Tony Schuman, Labor and Housing in New York City: Architect Herman Jessor and the Cooperative 
Housing Movement, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Accessed August 20, 2013 
http://urbanomnibus.net/redux/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/LABOR-AND-HOUSING-IN-NEW-
YORK-CITY.pdf, 5. 
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All of these apartments helped to make the creation of Penn South possible.  
The construction of earlier Amalgamated housing cooperatives connected Kazan to 
lawyers, engineers, and architects like Herman Jessor.  It also allowed for the 
evolution of Tudor style to modern, superblock construction, providing an 
opportunity for the designers and planners to see what did and did not work in large-
scale cooperative housing.  The construction of East River and Park Reservoir 
cooperatives afforded Kazan a familiarity and understanding in how to finance Penn 
South, while Seward Park gave him more experience in constructing larger housing 
developments, and also allowed him to save on construction contracts.  Yet even with 
the wealth of experience that Kazan and his colleagues gained from building the 
Amalgamated, East River, Park Reservoir and Seward Park cooperatives, Penn’s 
South construction and financing provided unforeseeable problems, which makes its 
story one of resilience and hard won success. 
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CHAPTER II: PLANNING PENN SOUTH 
 
This chapter chronicles the discussions that led to the construction of the 
cooperative, along with the obstacles that faced its board.  Though Kazan had 
previously faced resistance from the local communities on his other housing 
cooperatives, the delay caused by Chelsea tenants and their supporters resulted in a 
severely bloated project budget for Penn South.  Along with opposition from the local 
community, Kazan and his associates had to deal with a prolonged construction 
timetable due to strikes and labor disputes. 
Discussions over the construction of a new ILGWU sponsored housing project 
began in June 1956, but it was not until a year later that planning began.  Work on the 
application for incorporation began on May 16th with the help of Robert Szold, a 
lawyer who had been employed by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.  
Szold had acted as legal counsel for Kazan’s previous housing cooperatives and, in 
that capacity, sat on their boards.  From its inception, the project met with resistance 
from local community leaders. The Chelsea Citizen Project, a local community 
organization that strived to represent all of the local groups argued for a number of 
improvements to the neighborhood, favoring rehabilitation instead of new 
construction.24  Kazan and other members of the ILGWU, on the other hand, were 
primarily focused on new construction, a vision that was in line with the Urban 
Renewal ideology and policy of the time. 
 The members approached to sit on the new board were Luigi Antonini, George 
J. Mintzer, Isidore Nagler, Robert Szold, Harry Uviller, Charles S. Zimmerman, and 
                                                
24 George Sullivan to Louis Stulberg, March 15, 1957, ILGWU Collection, Kheel Center Archives, 
Cornell University. 
 14 
Kazan.  With the exceptions of Kazan and Szold, all of them had worked for the 
ILGWU in some form or capacity.   At the time of incorporation Antonini served as 
Vice President, and Zimmerman was the manager-secretary of Local 22.  Other 
members had previously held administrative positions in the ILGWU.  Nagler had 
worked in the Union as the manager of Local 10 for over 10 years, while Mintzer had 
served as an Impartial Chairman.  
The name that was tentatively chosen for incorporation was the ‘International 
Union Houses, Inc.,’ and the New York Secretary of State gave informal approval.  
Although never officially named that, Philip Blumberg, one of the UHF’s lawyers, 
assured Louis Stulberg, the Executive Vice President of the ILGWU at the time, that 
the delay for the approval of the name by the Boards of Standards and Appeals would 
not prove a major obstacle.  Wilbur Daniels, a member of the ILGWU's legal staff 
and counsel to Dubinsky, advised that the project be formally named the ILGWU 
Houses, as there had recently been a dispute over the name of the East River Houses.  
It had originally been agreed that the housing project would be named the ILGWU 
Village, in honor of the ILGWU’s involvement, but the name East River Housing was 
adopted because of its vernacular use, given the proximity to the East River.   The 
issue surrounding Penn South’s name would continue to be contested for a majority of 
the project's construction.  
In July 1957, the ILGWU approved the proposal for incorporation, but 
incorporation didn’t occur until January 1958 when its was approved by Leland E. 
Gerose the Comptroller of New York City after multiple modifications and 
amendments were made.  Shortly after incorporation in 1958, the board of directors 
met to discuss the next steps in the project and seven concerns were cited.  The first 
issue concerned the construction of the project.  The board voted that the Foundation's 
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subsidiary, Community Services Inc., would have direct responsibility for a set fee of 
1% of the cost of construction.25  The second question involved financing.  The board 
also agreed that the project was to be financed through bonds under a trust indenture 
for no more than 80% of the cost of the project.  The ILGWU offered to purchase 
two-thirds of the mortgage bonds for up to $20,000,000, while the rest of the 
indenture bonds would be issued to institutional investors, such as the Bowery Saving 
Bank, which Kazan had already contacted.  Bonds held by institutional investors were 
to be held at a rate of one quarter of 1% more than those bonds held by the ILGWU.  
The ILGWU's agreement to a lesser rate would remain consistent throughout the 
project, even during mid-1980s when the project managers refinanced the mortgage. 
 Institutional investors, such as the Savings Bank Trust Company, were also 
given the right to designate an associate of their institutions as a member of the MRH 
board of directors.  A seat on the board of directors gave the institutional investors an 
extra measure of assurance, allowing them to be involved in the board’s decision-
making process.  Kazan had hoped that the incorporation at the beginning of the year 
would allow for the ILGWU House, Inc. to purchase the project area on April 1st, 
1958, the target date of the City’s Committee on Slum Clearance. This approval was 
crucial because it allowed the corporation to bypass individual owners and instead 
buy the land from the city at cost. 
The ILGWU officially announced the plan to the press on February 19th, 1958, 
but fissures within the project were already beginning to appear.  Suspicions arose 
that Kazan was favoring contractors who had rigged their bids, and that the union was 
paying more than it should for the contractors.26  It was a plausible supposition since 
Kazan continued to employ many of the same contractors that he had previously 
                                                
25 “Directors' Meeting of I.L.G.W.U. Houses, Inc.,” (1957): 2. 
26 'An Ardent Supporter to David Dubinsky, February 23, 1958, ILGWU Collection, Kheel Center 
Archives, Cornell University. 
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employed, and given his position as president of Community Services Inc.  On top of 
claims of favoritism, the board had to deal with opposition from the local community. 
Organizations in Chelsea were beginning to mobilize residents against the 
project, claiming an unfair advantage to union workers over the tenants and 
businessmen who already occupied the project site.  The ILGWU held an open 
meeting on the project on March 19 at P.S. 33, designed to meet with the residents, 
the landlords and the businessmen community who had been organized with the help 
of “Chelsea for Chelsea” to object to the project.”27  Multiple fliers were handed out, 
some in Spanish, a smart move to address the large Hispanic population in the 
community.  Many of the tenants criticized Kazan and the ILGWU, arguing that they 
were treated inhumanely and being forcibly evicted.  Due to the numerous complaints 
by local residents, the Borough President Hulan E. Jack organized a Citizen’s 
Watchdog Committee.  Still, Kazan and his board pushed to get approval from the 
city so that construction work could begin. 
On November 14th, 1958 the public hearing for the approval of Penn South's 
designation as an Urban Renewal project was heard and passed.  Three days later, on 
November 17, the city-planning department in a closed hearing to approve work for 
the West Twenty-Ninth Street, Eight Avenue, West Twenty-Third Street, and Ninth 
Avenue, tentatively named the “Plan for a Redevelopment Project,” was also heard.28  
To ensure the City Housing Committee approved the adoption of both plans, 
Dubinsky lobbied various government officials.  He sent a telegram to James Felt, the 
Chairman of the City Planning Commission, urging him "to approve [the] plan for 
[the] ILGWU houses in Chelsea, which [would] provide much needed middle income 
housing for twenty-eight hundred families" and to listen to the representative he 
                                                
27 “Open Meeting to be Held at ILGWU to be Held at P.S. 33 March 19,” Chelsea-Clinton News 
(1958): 1. 
28 “Housing,” Public Hearings, (1958): 14. 
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would send to meet with him to expand on the scheme."29  
On December 11, the first official Board of Directors meeting was held.   The 
quorum of directors Luigi Antonini, Abraham Kazan, George Mintzer, Louis 
Stulberg, Robert Szold and Harry Uviller met at the ILGWU headquarters at 1710 
Broadway Street.  The purpose of the meeting was to authorize the construction of the 
project.  After the minutes of the previous meeting was approved and new officers 
were elected, discussion turned to the status of the project.  Approval of the proposed 
contract with the City of New York was followed by the authorization of construction 
contracts and the management contract with Community Services, Inc., approval of 
apartment application and subscription, approval for leasing space at 530 Grand 
Street, retention of architects, accountants and attorneys, approval for an architect's 
revolving fund, and finally the authorization to open bank accounts.  Kazan was 
elected as president, while Stulberg and Szold were jointly elected to the position of 
Vice President.  Antonini was elected as Treasurer, and Ostroff and Altman were 
elected as Secretary and Assistant Secretary respectively.  After the election of 
officers, Kazan presented the board with a summary of the projects progress along 
with the booklet entitled “Some Pertinent Facts About Housing Cooperatives and 
Prospectus on ILGWU Housing Inc."  According to Kazan, at the time of the meeting 
approximately thirty six hundred people had already applied and paid a down 
payment of $500 each.  The money had been collected by Community Services, Inc. 
and had been deposited at The Amalgamated Bank of New York where most of it was 
drawing interest30  
The number of applicants had already far exceeded the number apartments 
that would be available.  The project was designed to contain approximately 2,814 
                                                
29 “Housing,” Public Hearings, (1958): 14. 
30 “Directors' Meeting of I.L.G.W.U. Houses, Inc.,” (1958): 3. 
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units and be built at the cost of $37,000,000.  This was a budget that would later be 
surpassed by over $5,000,000 because of delays and additional improvements.  The 
adopted budget proposed that 20% of the mortgage would be composed of the tenants' 
equity, at $650 per room, with a $23 carrying charge.  Rent for an apartment 
composed of four rooms averaged at $73 per month, while the cost of ownership was 
$17,000.31 It was decided that the rest of budget would be covered by loans from 
various financial institutions including the ILGWU. 
The Board decided that Community Services, Inc. in addition to supervising 
construction would take full responsibility for the management of the existing site, 
deal with the relocations of tenants and the processing of prospective tenant-
cooperators.  This arrangement had been used for the construction of the Seward Park 
and Kingsview Housing projects.  The board stipulated that, since Kazan had a 
personal investment and bias towards Community Services Inc., Stulberg would act 
on behalf of the housing company in dealing with all of their responsibilities. 
Kazan advised the board to retain the architect Herman Jessor, certified public 
accountants Apfel & Englander and attorneys Szold, Brandwen, Meyers & Blumberg, 
all of whom he had previously hired to work on housing projects.  Kazan had already 
retained Jessor for $15,000 to develop drawings and specifications.  Szold, as 
previously mentioned, was a part of the ILGWU Houses, Inc. board, and thus had a 
large advantage and the full expectation of being retained.  Kazan had contacted 
previous associates and rented out office space as early as November 1958, even 
though the issues dealing with how to move forward on the project were officially 
settled by the action of the Board of Directors on December 10th.  
Residents based in Chelsea continued to fight against the project.  In February 
                                                
31  “100 Years of U.S. Consumer Spending: Data for the Nation, New York City, and Boston,” Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/opub/uscs/1960-61.pdf, 30 
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1959, one tenant who lived on the project site wrote to Dubinsky warning him about 
the upcoming City Hall meeting.  As a member of the ILGWU, he urged Dubinsky to 
send materials that would represent all of the good work that the union had done in 
the Hispanic community.  He specifically suggested sending the "blood mobile" that 
the union had received as gift from Puerto Rico for all the aid that the ILGWU had 
provided to the country.  He also advised sending "plain ordinary members of Spanish 
descent" to speak on behalf of the union to discredit "those trying to use the Spanish 
people against the housing project.”32  
Even in the face of community resistance, only four months later, on June 30, 
Kazan accepted the deed to the land paying a sum $3,756,221.80, in a down payment 
toward the total cost of $13,300,000 with the remainder to be paid over four years at a 
rate of 5% per annum.  The original estimate for land by the city had been 
$21,000,000, but the assessed valuation at purchase was dropped to $13,300,000. The 
difference, of $7,700,000, was jointly paid to the property holders.  By July 16, an 
urban relocation company was hired to help relocated tenants at the cost of $23 per 
family.  The firm had previously worked on the Seward Park project.33  The previous 
projects general involved getting the lowest possible prices by buying in bulk.  
By September 4th, four hundred and sixteen families had been relocated.   
Three hundred and forty-one had vacated the premises, five had found public housing, 
one hundred and twenty-nine had been vacated to other apartments found by the 
Urban Relocation office, two hundred fifty-eight had been given cash to vacate, while 
twenty-four had already vacated.  There were still issues with on-site tenants, who 
with the help of the Chelsea Community Council and other local officials, were 
                                                
32 Eugene Szepesy to David Dubinsky, February 7, 1959, ILGWU Collection, Kheel Center Archives, 
Cornell University. 
33 “Directors' Meeting of I.L.G.W.U. Houses, Inc.,” (1959), 2. 
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creating a stink about the way in which tenants were being relocated.34  The group 
had also secured affidavits from the workers about on-site maintenance and had 
succeeded in getting press coverage and the appointment of a watchdog committee by 
the Borough President.35  
When the assertions proved false, the dispute evaporated.36   The largest source 
of the difficulties rose from the claims of the residents in the remaining rooming 
houses, but meetings with the Commissioner of Real Estate, Mr. J. Clarence Davies 
Jr., who had been supervising the work, were underway.  Two hundred eighty-eight of 
the families on site had made deposits for cooperative apartments.  Meanwhile by 
September 11, 1959, bids for demolition contractors had been published in an 
advertisement in The New York Times, as required by the Federal Housing and Home 
Finance Agency, and other government sponsors.37 
Issues with the naming of the project continued, as Elias Lieberman requested 
that Kazan formally name the cooperative the ILGWU Houses.  The use of ‘Penn 
South’ in lieu of the ILGWU Houses had not only found its way into the vernacular, 
but was also prominent in business correspondence between the board and various 
financial institutions.   Along with a formalization of the projects name, Lieberman 
also requested an official change in the corporation's name, as the name the ILGWU 
Houses, Inc. left the Union open to liability.  Kazan agreed even though he noted that  
it would take at least three months to secure the name change on the certificate of 
incorporation.  The change in incorporation was announced on October 27th barely a 
month later, and the corporation’s name was officially changed from the ILGWU 
Houses, Inc. to the Mutual Redevelopment Houses, Inc., (MRH). 
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37 Ibid. 
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Relocating tenants continued to attract more media coverage.  The Cohn's, a 
family who had acted as superintendents for the site before the MRH purchase, were 
forced to sign a promissory note to move out by April 15, 1960, while under the threat 
of having their possessions thrown out into the street.  According to the site manager 
Arnold Merritt however, the Cohn's were not official tenants.  As such they had no 
legal expectations of receiving a final eviction notice.  The attempt to force the Cohn's 
out was heavily criticized by the Chelsea Tenants Center, which encouraged people to 
write the Borough President Hulan E. Jack, and ask him to reappoint a Citizen's 
Watchdog Committee.  The appeal proved a fruitless effort, as the watchdog 
committee collapsed due to infighting.  One group within the committee charged the 
project of neglecting and abusing the tenants who were being relocated.  The other 
group, led by H. Daniel Carpenter, future President and Chairman of the housing 
project, contended that they were unable to discover any major instance in which a 
tenant experienced difficulty.38   
The Board of Estimate officially approved the project on March 25, 1959.  By 
mid-August, the demolition of three hundred and seventeen buildings was almost 
complete.  It was expected that the remaining forty buildings would be demolished 
within the next four to six weeks.  All tenants, both commercial and residential, had 
also been removed, except for the Terrace Theater, which had been included in the 
project at the request of the theater president Bernard B. Brandt.  Even though 
demolition was mostly complete, only the excavation was approved at an estimated 
cost of $165,000.  
By October 25th work had begun on foundations in four buildings.  The MRH 
turned their attention to the permits and documents necessary to complete 
construction.  By late February 1960, Kazan had met with the city Building 
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Department and obtained the permits needed for the construction of pipes and 
conduits along Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Sixth and West Twenty-Eighth 
Street.  
Construction was delayed due to winter weather, but by the spring of 1960 
foundation work was almost complete, and some of the apartment buildings had 
already been built up to the third floor.  The amount expended was about 
$12,800,000.  
The lease for the Terrace Theater had also been submitted to the Board for 
approval.  Even though construction had begun, it wasn't until March 9th, 1961 that 
architect Herman Jessor obtained approval for the project plans and the specifications 
from the New York City Department of Buildings.  On April 25 Jessor also obtained 
certification toward the extension of money in an amount of no less than $7,577,000 
in connection with the construction of the project. 
Construction was well underway by late April 1961.  Framing had gone up to 
the eighth floor in building one, up to the fifth floor in building two, up to the third 
floor in building three, and the second floor in building four.  Concrete had been laid 
in building five up to the eighth floor, and in building six up to the sixth floor.  Steel 
had been installed in building seven up to the seventh floor, in building eight up to the 
eighth floor in building nine up to the fifth floor, and in building ten up to the eighth 
floor.  The boiler room was being framed out and the excavation for oil tanks, 
alongside, was complete”39  
Beyond the heavy construction, subcontractors were now involved in fitting 
out each of the structures.  Electrical feeder risers were in the process of being fitted 
in buildings one, eight, and nine, and the fire lines were in the process of being 
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installed in all buildings but building four.  Water lines were also underway in 
buildings one, five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten, while gas lines were being set in 
buildings one, five, seven, eight, and ten.  Vent lines had already started installment in 
building ten.  Cast iron sewer lines were being laid in all buildings but numbers three 
and four, and cast iron stacks were being installed in buildings one, five, seven, eight, 
and ten.  Cellar mains for steam were in the process of being hung in buildings one, 
five, six, seven, eight, nine, and ten, and underground main steam lines were in the 
process of being mounted in buildings one, two, nine, and ten. 
By May 5th concrete had been laid in buildings one, two, and three. Framing 
had been installed in building four, five, and six.  The framing had also been installed 
in building seven, eight, nine, and ten.  Electrical feeder risers were in the process of 
being fitted in five buildings.  Slab conduits were being installed with the framing 
slabs and outside underground conduits were being laid.  Fire lines were also in the 
process of being installed in all of the structures.  Water lines were completed; while 
gas lines were being installed in the basements of three of the buildings.  Cast iron 
sewer lines and stacks were being installed in most of the property.  Cellar mains and 
underground water lines for steam were in the process of being hung in all buildings 
but two.   O'Reilly reported that 80% of the boiler room had been completed, merely a 
week later.  Elevator rail brackets were in the process of being hung in four of the 
buildings. 
By May, the lack of materials and workers slowed progress somewhat, but the 
arrival of windows and elevators signaled the beginning of the end of construction.   
Work in concrete, steel, framing continued slowly in all but three buildings.  Five oil 
tanks were set in place and two steam boilers had been delivered to the site.  
Excavation of the garage's foundation had begun, and every building was provided 
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with temporary electrical service.  By May 27th, brickwork and window installation 
had begun.40  The boiler room began to be being back-filled, and kitchen risers were 
installed in all of the buildings.  Fire lines and risers were also installed in every 
building but one.  To provide steam to the building, twelve oil tanks and a boiler set 
were installed.  Elevators were also set in in seven of the buildings, while the elevator 
rails were hung in three of the buildings. 
By summer though, additional delays in construction had popped up at the 
project site.  Concrete drivers had gone on strike, which had stopped work for nine 
weeks.  This was followed by the electrical workers walk out, which resulted in an 
additional delay of two weeks.  Both strikes resulted in the contractors’ inability to 
rehire their experienced trade workers.41  The delay was costly because other trades 
work was delayed.  Delays in heating, water, and air-conditioning led to other delays 
in plaster work.  This, in turn, required additional cost because the interiors needed 
temporary heat.42  Walls near the water lines were then also opened to inspect them 
for possible leaks.   
Even with the delays tenant-cooperators had already begun to move into 
building five on May 14, 1962, five days before the project was officially opened.  
The dedication on May 19, 1962 included scores of union members, the press, and 
tenant cooperatives and a number of notable figures. These included Eleanor 
Roosevelt, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, ILGWU President David Dubinsky, the 
New York City Mayor Robert F. Wagner, urban planner Robert Moses, and President 
John F. Kennedy.  Eleanor Roosevelt had been involved in various union and 
affordable housing activities and had attended other dedications.  On the other hand 
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this was the first and only union housing dedication that Kennedy would attend.  His 
appearance was the result of a last minute invitation from Dubinsky, with whom he 
had worked with previously.  Dubinsky and the union had also supported his 1960 
election, registering voters and running a variety of media campaigns to get out the 
vote for Kennedy.   
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CHAPTER III: FINANCING, REPAIRS AND LIFE IN THE COOPERATIVE 
 
 This chapter touches on funding issues in relation to repairs, updates, rent 
issues, and finally the creation of community through tenant engagement. The first 
half of the chapter details the cooperatives issues with financing, while the second 
half covers the formation of the community around social events and clubs.  The 
cooperative was faced with increasing costs due to various breakdowns, repairs, and 
funding issues, but was able to tackle the costs through collaboration between the 
community, the MRH board, creditors, and New York City.  The process of funding 
and cost saving strategies has allowed the cooperative to provide affordable housing 
for moderate to low-income tenants for over half a century.  
By 1958 the city had agreed to sell the whole project site at $4 per square foot 
or $21,000,000.  By early December, Kazan had completed talks with Leland E. 
Gerose, the Comptroller of New York City, and the Committee on Slum Clearance to 
attain an exemption of 45% of the total assets upon the same terms that had been 
previously agreed to with the Seward Park Housing project. The goal of the 
exemption was to lower the construction budget, ultimately making the cost of the 
cooperative apartments units more affordable.  It was agreed that 10% of the cost 
would be paid upon the signing of the contract; 40% when obtaining the deed and the 
remainder would be paid out over a period of five years.  The city also required that 
the carrying charges not exceed $0.35 per month; any additional charges would have 
to be reviewed by the Board of Estimate of the City of New York.  The contract 
required that the equity investment not be more than $650 per month.  Finally, the 
contract set a limited equity restriction on the property for twenty-five years.  This 
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meant that for the next quarter of a century the housing corporation paid the assessed 
tax evaluation of the property set in 1958 plus an additional increment to be 
predetermined by the city. 
 For the first five years, the housing company was to pay no additional 
amount, merely the set taxes.  Then, during the next five years the housing company 
was to pay $60,000 in addition to the set taxes.  In the third period of five years, the 
company was to pay a $120,000 per year in addition to the set taxes.  The amount of 
additional funds was set to increase at a fixed rate of $60,000 every five years, and 
after twenty-five years the project would pay full taxes. 
Only seven months later, however, the city announced changes to its original 
tax estimates calling for additional taxes.  The increase in the first five years was over 
a $1,000 per year, at $175,000 per year for the second five year period, $220,000 per 
year for the third five year period and $235,000 per year for the fourth five year 
period.  The fifth five-year period was left open to be renegotiated, and the project 
was still to pay full taxes after twenty-five years.  Given the “substantially greater” 
taxes “insisted upon by Comptroller Gerose” the rent was increased to $24 per room 
per month.43  
To fund the project, Kazan hoped to tap the New York State Teachers' 
Retirement Fund (NYSTRF) for $10,000,000. He failed to enlist the services of the 
Bowery Savings Bank, who he had hoped would be willing to supply the estimated 
funds needed to furnish the rest of the mortgage.  And even though Kazan was unsure 
about the total cost or the timetable, he had estimated that the project would cost 
around $38,000,000 and construction would be ready to begin within a year.  Both 
were estimations, which ended up being overly optimistic  
To lower costs, Kazan asked the ILGWU's attorney, Lieberman, whether it 
                                                
43 “Directors' Meeting of I.L.G.W.U. Houses, Inc.,” (1959), 2. 
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would be possible for the ILGWU to waive the title insurance, or if title insurance had 
to be taken, whether it could be purchased through City Title Insurance Company as it 
would “save the project considerable money in connection with the premium for such 
insurance.”44 He also asked Lieberman if the ILGWU would need to have a separate 
appraiser and independent certification concerning construction.  Lieberman 
responded that the ILGWU would be willing to waive both if the NYSTRF suggested 
reputable firms for hire to oversee construction and appraisal.  Lastly, Kazan 
requested an advance loan of $10,000,000 to cover the construction cost, as the 
NYSTRF was unwilling to lend any money until after construction had been 
completed.  On this point, Lieberman was adamant that the board would have to 
secure the $10,000,000 construction loan from another source.  Lieberman was loath 
to advise the ILGWU to lend funds for construction, given the risky nature of such a 
loan.  
By early December though, Kazan had secured a letter from the 
Manufacturers Trust Company supporting a loan of $5,000,000 during construction. 
He has also secured a letter from the NYSTRF pledging $3,000,000 for construction 
and a promise of a $2,000,000 construction loan from the Construction Bank, with the 
stipulation that the ILGWU advance $20,000,000 during construction or the Mutual 
Redevelopment Houses take out a performance bond to cover the loan.  Kazan 
rejected the idea of performance bond “since the amount of the mortgage [was] so 
large [that] the cost would be prohibitive.”45   Meanwhile Lieberman vehemently 
opposed the advancement of the $20,000,000 because of the risk it would incur and 
the fact that the ILGWU had not, at the time, been given any cost estimates by Kazan 
or anyone on the Mutual Redevelopment Houses board   
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The third option for raising funds for construction from the tenant-cooperators 
was also unfeasible because of the timetable and given that the project had already 
incurred $4,000,000 worth of debt due to relocation and demolition costs.  Against 
Lieberman's advice, the ILGWU decided in favor of advancing the money to the 
MRH, if the MRH could supply the union with an estimated cost for the project, 
contracts, an approximate time when the loan would be needed, and estimated yearly 
income and expenses from when the project was completed.  A week later the 
NYSTRF took up the application for the loan  
Unfortunately the NYSTRF remained unsatisfied with some of the key points 
of the loan so that the mortgage continued to be delayed.   The questions raised by the 
NYSTRF were whether the project had firm contracts and if the new appliances, i.e. 
ranges and refrigerators, would be owned by the tenant-cooperators or by the housing 
project.  The NYSTRF also wondered whether the tenant-cooperators paid equity in 
full and if the project could be complete within two years from the date of 
commitment.  If not, would the MRH board be willing to forfeit the loan fee of a 
$100,000?  
More importantly, though, the NYSTRF required a construction loan, which 
Kazan had been “either reluctant or unable to furnish,” and amortization for three 
months after the closing of the loan.46  Kazan, on the other hand, wanted amortization 
to begin a year after the loan closed.  Another sticking point for the NYSTRF was that 
it wanted the same 2% amortization rate that the ILGWU held, instead of the 1.75% 
that it had been offered.  The main issue, Lieberman noted, was that “basically, the 
lenders of the construction money want to be satisfied that the project has sufficient 
money for its completion.”47  This was also in light of the fact that the tenants’ equity, 
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which was estimated to be $8,000,000, ended up being $350,000 less than originally 
projected.  
By May 5th, 1960, Kazan's refusal to secure a completion bond led the 
NYSTRF to withdraw their offer of $5,000,000 for the construction loan.  Unsure that 
the MRH would be able to secure funds for construction, it was clear that the project 
would not meet the June deadline to begin construction.  Lieberman also “advised 
against going to Manufactured Trust” without “being in a position to assure the bank 
that all the other funds necessary for construction [were] available.”48  Even though 
90% of tenants had moved off site and Kazan had agreed to contracts for concrete, 
electrical work, roofing, elevators, and demolition, funding for construction had not 
been secured.  The project had already run up a cost of $7,577,000 with only 75% of 
those costs acquired   
Regardless the MRH had given concessions for a 2% amortization for the 
long-term loan borrowed from the NYSTRF, with the agreement that it would 
commence on July 1, 1962, and be paid in monthly installments.  The MRH agreed to 
relinquish the $100,000 that had already been deposited, if it did not go through with 
the loan for the project.  There seemed to have been a difference in understanding 
however, between the NYSTRF and Kazan.  Mr. Murray, the director of the 
NYSTRF, held that amortization would begin when the project was completed with 
90% occupancy or on July 1, 1962 at the latest.  The NYSTRF also agreed to waive 
the completion bond if a $5,000,000 reimbursement bond was taken out in the event 
that the project was not completed, but this term was unacceptable to Kazan.  
Funding continued to be a sticking point and by May 16th, 1960, the cost of 
relocation had risen to $650,000.  Twenty-one families remained on site and they 
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were not signed up to move.  Kazan, however, estimated that they would be gone 
within six weeks.  To cover the extra cost of relocation the board agreed to charge the 
expense to the construction budget.  Kazan was hopeful, though, that by the end of 
May more than two-thirds of the construction capitol would be raised, with the cost of 
demolition and relocation being paid by the income received from current onsite 
tenants. 
By May, all of but a few apartments in the ten buildings had also been 
assigned, and the 25% of equity was to be paid when construction started.  Test 
borings had also shown that some buildings would require only spread footing not 
piles or mats, reducing the cost of construction.  The cost for electrical work had 
increased though, as had the metal doors and bucks.  Construction estimates had also 
increased almost $1,000,000 to a cost of $10,812,493. 
It wasn’t until early June that long term financing for the mortgage was 
secured from the ILGWU with a loan of $20,000,000, the NYSTRF with a loan of 
$10,000,000, and the tenant-cooperators with $7,500,000 in equity.  The Chemical 
Bank New York Trust Company (CB) had secured funds for construction with a loan 
of $2,000,000.  The Manufacturers Trust (MT) provided another construction loan of 
$3,000,000.  Even with the loans from the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company 
and Manufacturers Trust, the MRH was still short $5,000,000, given that it was 
unwilling to supply a $5,000,000 bond to the NYSTRF.  
There was some talk of possibly renegotiating the $5,000,000-construction 
loan with the NYSTRF, in view of the fact that the UHF had secured $28,000,000 
from the NYSTRF for the Jamaica project and had supplied them with a completion 
bond.  The financing issue continued until August, when the Chemical Bank offered 
to increase the construction loan from $2,000,000 to $7,000,000.  Still Kazan refused 
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to “proceed with the drafting of the documents for the construction loan.”49  The 
NYSTRF also continued to object to the 25% increase in amortization that had been 
given to the union. 
The cost of the project continued to increase.  In August, after deciding to 
keep the Terrace Theater, costs increased another $100,000.  Overall project costs 
rose due to millwork raising the budget another $490,000.  The inclusion of an 
electrical generating plant to provide air-conditioning for the entire project was also 
expected to incur an additional $3,000,000, resulting in an increase of a $1.50 per 
room.  Its inclusion, though, was approved by a 78% vote of the tenant-cooperators, 
making the project one of the first cooperatives to include air-cooling “operated by 
steam with the circulation of hot water providing heat in winter and cold water 
providing cooling in summer.”50  The inclusion of extra costs into the budget along 
with the inability to secure construction loans caused the MRH board to decide to 
delay construction. 
In late August 1960, the NYSTRF called for “a whole mortgage” and not “the 
type of mortgage bond… proposed by Kazan.”51  Attempts at securing the 
construction loan, though, were underway.  Independent architects for MT and CB 
undertook a review to see if there would be enough money to complete the project.  
The work, though a step towards securing a loan for construction, incurred further 
costs to the project.  Even with the cost estimations complete, the banks refused to 
make a formal loan commitment until the NYSTRF agreed to sign a statement, which 
committed them to purchasing $10,000,000 in bonds upon completion of the project.  
On the other hand Murray wanted a whole mortgage instead of bonds, and 
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also preferred an agreement solely with the MRH instead of additional agreements 
with the banks.  Given the NYSTRF's distrust of indenture bonds, Lieberman 
consulted with the Deputy Comptroller William Girden about the legality of the 
bonds, under Section 12 of the Redevelopment Companies Law.  Lieberman was 
particularly curious to see if there was a way in which the bonds could provide extra 
protection for the NYSTRF loan.  He hoped that the extra protection would induce 
Murray to accept the bonds as the method of collateral instead of a traditional 
mortgage.  Bonds were necessary for the ILGWU, since the multiple union trust made 
a conventional loan impossible.  
The legal department of the union argued for the $10,000,000 loan to be made 
in the form of a note, but, by October, the Retirement Fund had agreed to accept the 
bonds under a mortgage trust indenture, asking “that except for the differences in the 
rate of interest, all the provisions in all the bonds must be identical, and they must 
rank equally.”52  
Disputes between the NYSTRF and the other funding institutions remained.  
The Retirement Fund desired the Irving Company as a trustee to which the MT did 
not agree.  The NYSTRF also preferred to have an agreement solely with the MRH to 
buy the $10,000,000 in bonds, instead of the additional agreements that were held 
with the MT and CB.  The NYSTRF wanted the title insurance to be split evenly 
between the City Title and Home Title Companies, but Mr. Sunshine, of the MT, 
disagreed.  As a member of the board of the Title Guarantee and Trust Company, 
Sunshine preferred the whole of the title insurance be given solely to the Title 
Guarantee and Trust Company.  Due to the issues between the NYSTRF and the other 
loan institutions, it took an additional two weeks for the MRH to approve the 
$10,000,000 from the MT and CB. 
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By late October the MRH secured a performance bond for the subcontractors 
in the amount $20,000,000 at a cost of $112,500.  A representative of the 
Manufacturers Trust Bank was also elected to serve as a trustee.  The date for 
mortgage maturity was also set for January 1, 1983 at a rate of 5.25% per annum for 
the NYSTRF and at a rate of 5.25% for the ILGWU.  The budget for air-conditioning 
decreased, and was estimated to be only $0.05 to $0.75 extra per room.   
Problems with financing continued.  The NYSTRF called for approval of 
plans and specifications for the garage and commercial space, and agreed to move the 
completion date for payments of amortization to begin, back to January 1, 1963.  The 
issue of the title insurance continued to be debated.  The MRH also refused to furnish 
fire insurance, which had been especially requested by the MT, and by late January 
the MT had stepped “out of the picture, both as lender and as Trustee,” while [the] 
Dry Dock Savings Bank (DD) had come in as lender for the three million towards the 
construction money and permanent loan.”53  
About the same time, the Chemical Bank became the trustee of the mortgage, 
in place of the MT, and agreed to loan the $7,000,000 necessary for construction.  The 
switch to the DD incurred further cost due to the retention of and additional 
independent architect and lender supervisor.  Because of the “risky” nature of 
construction money Lieberman also suggested that the loans be lent at a rate of 5.25% 
per annum.54  In late April 1961, a Certification of Approval was obtained between 
the MRH and the NYSTRF and a memorandum of understanding was given to the 
MRH, DD, CB and the ILGWU.  
Thanks to Lieberman's mediation, the paperwork for the loans was finished by 
the April 28th deadline, and the bonds and checks were distributed on March 1st.  The 
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trustee checks for $2,000,000 from ILGWU and $1,000,000 from the DD and the CB 
were turned over to the MRH.  Cashing the check, the MRH was also able to repay 
the $400,000 loan from the Amalgamated Bank of New York.  To meet other costs it 
was also decided to lease the Twenty-third Street Theater to the RKO Company at an 
average rental of $47,000 per year, for twenty-one years with a $50,000 security 
deposit.  
To insure the payment of the construction bills, Kazan and the MRH requested 
an additional loan of $2,001,000 from the DD.  Even with the $3,000,000 advance, by 
June, the MRH was in the process of requesting an additional loan of $2,200,000, as 
advised by O'Reilly, the supervisory architect for the DD.  As the project continued to 
hemorrhage funds the MRH board met with the city to ensure that the rent would 
remain manageable, as further costs might devastate the cost-effectiveness of the 
project. 
 In July 1961, the Board of Estimates approved an amendment to the MRH's 
housing contract.  The amendment largely dealt with the income limitations of the 
tenant-cooperators, stating that “dwelling units in the project shall be available for 
persons or families of low or moderate income whose probable aggregate annual 
income at the time of the admissions does not exceed eight times the rental including 
the value of cost to them of the utilities that may be furnished to such dwelling 
units.”55  The amendment also stated that the tenant’s probable aggregate, or the 
annual income of the chief wage earner plus “his” spouse, could not exceed one 125% 
of his maximum permissible income.  Tenant-cooperators over the income limit 
would face bill surcharges.56  The following table shows the Board of Estimate 
surcharge amendment to the MRH’s housing contract. 
                                                
55 Harold Ostroff to Mutual Redevelopment Houses, Inc.,“Anticipated Payments due and to be Made 
During the Month of June, 1961”, May 25, 1961. 
56 Irving J. Alter to Louis Stulberg, August 2, 1962, ILGWU Collection, Kheel Center Archives, 
Cornell University. 
 36 
To facilitate the amendments, the Board of Estimate called for income surveys 
to be distributed and examined along with the submission of income tax returns from 
1961 before perspective tenant-cooperators were allowed to move in.  The change 
proved costly for the MRH board of directors, as cooperators had already begun to 
move in. 
By early July 1962, Kazan was in negotiations with the city’s Housing and 
Redevelopment Board to modify the contract so tenants would be allowed to move in, 
as stopping them “would impose hardship on the tenant-cooperators who have made 
plans, preparations and adjustments.”57  It also provided a hardship for the MRH 
Board, which was unable to collect rent during the moratorium. All tenants had 
previously signed affidavits that their income was below the 105% limit and the MRH 
Board stated they were “not interested in protecting a tenant who had made a false 
affidavits as to his income.”58  The MRH Board argued that the city had not taken a 
stand on the issue of the affidavit and that rules adopted by the city in June 1961 were 
still in effect.  A committee was then formed by the Mutual Redevelopment Housing 
Board to meet with the Housing and Redevelopment Board on the occupancy matter.  
It was composed of Louis Stulberg, Abraham Kazan, and Harry Uviller.  Luckily the 
MRH committee was fruitful and the tenant-cooperators were able to move in in early 
July.   Unfortunately though, not all of the apartments were complete. 
Delays continued to occur due to a shortage of workmen, which increased the 
cost of the project.  The MRH Board thus authorized Kazan to talk to the mortgages 
holders about extending the date of completion from July 1, 1962 to January 1, 
1963.59  By late September and early October of 1962, the ILGWU and the DD 
agreed to move back the date of amortization to July 1, 1963 and the maturity date of 
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the loan to July 1, 1983.  Even though seven of the buildings had been partially or 
fully occupied the construction work would not be fully completed for at least three 
more months. 
The MRH was forced to incur more expenses given the interest on the 
invested capital and expenses for overhead and labor.  Although the original cost of 
the project had been estimated to be $39,000,000, by mid-October it had risen to 
$41,000,375.  To meet the cost the Board favored a combination of an increase in the 
mortgage loan, an increase in the bond issue, an increase in the tenant-cooperators 
equity investment, or a deferment of amortization payments.  The Board voted to 
extend the amortization payment period, which was agreed to by the DD, the ILGWU 
and the NYSTRF, and, which was estimated to make up for $300,000 of the deficit.60  
The Board argued that the next best step would be to increase the mortgage, and if 
that were impossible, to distribute bonds that would not exceed ten years.  
Cost issues continued to arise in October 1962.  Although New York City did 
not tax buildings under construction for a year, the period of construction had, by 
October, exceeded a year.  Due to the fact the project was not yet complete, the MRH 
voted to appeal to the Board of Assessors for a deferment of taxes.   
Another problem arose when the MRH faced litigation caused by the damage 
done to the furniture of tenant-cooperators after they had been removed from the 
premise.  The MRH offered to pay $5 to $10 per family for the cost of damage that 
had occurred, but some owners were unwilling to accept the offer and decided to take 
the MRH to trial.  The Housing and Redevelopment Board also presented extra bills 
to the MRH board.  $38,005 was being charged for the approval of the redevelopment 
plan plus an additional $175,000 for what Kazan called “presumable[e]... supervision 
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of the construction.”61   
Although the project had neared completion, on October 9th the mortgage loan 
was raised by $1,500,000 to cover extra costs, and the start date for amortization was 
moved back to July 1, 1963.  The mortgage maturity date was, accordingly, extended 
to July 1, 1983.62  In early November, the DD purchased series “C” bonds to cover the 
$1,500,000 loan, while the MRH opened up an account at the Manufacturers Hanover 
Trust Company to deposit the coins from the laundry room. 
Complications with funding continued into early 1963, and by March, Kazan 
had petitioned the ILGWU for another $100,000 loan, at a rate of 5% over five years, 
for the air-conditioning system.  Air-conditioning had not originally been considered 
for this type of housing and was not mentioned for inclusion until the latter end of 
construction.  The novelty of this type of system in large, low-income housing was 
risky and the price steep.  The final cost of air-conditioning ended up amounting to 
around $2,000,000, $600,000 more than original estimates.  
By mid-June 1963, the start date of amortization payments had been changed 
once again.  It was agreed that amortization payments would not begin until the 
completion of construction or on September 1st, by the latest.  While the final cost was 
unclear, at that point it was assumed that it would be available within the next six 
weeks.  It was “clear, however, that the cost of the project exceed[ed] the original 
budget by a significant amount,” given that delays and additional construction had 
called for the advancement of several million dollars.  Although, according to 
members of the MRH Board it was still at a cost lower than the norm thanks to 
Kazan.63  Changes in the commercial space, though, had caused the Housing and 
Home Finance Agency to reappraise the land for $31,500,000, a $1,500,000 from a 
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previous estimation supplied by Kazan.  
Additional troubles with the tenant-cooperators continued to arise.  The 
Housing and Redevelopment Board removed eight residents because they were over 
the income limit.  Legal notices had also been served to nine more tenant-cooperators 
who had brought dogs into the cooperative, since they had previously signed a lease 
not to bring in animals.  The vacancies were quickly filled, as there were 3,000 
additional applications already on file.  The number of inquiries for apartments rose 
so large that MRH froze the waiting list, estimating that it would take over 10 years to 
house the additional applicants.  
Although the residential buildings were completely full, commercial tenants 
were stilling being sought.  The Hudson Guild requested a lease of three of the 
community rooms in building six, while their building was under construction.  It 
planned to turn the rooms into a senior citizen facility, which would be accessible to a 
majority of the residents and the surrounding community.  The lease for the Guild was 
quickly approved.  The bowling alley Lences Lane Inc. also requested to lease 
commercial space from the MRH.  This plan called for the construction of bowling 
lanes and an escalator to the second floor, installed, of course, at the expense of that 
company.  The board of the MRH was leery of due to the alterations that would need 
to be undertaken.  Although Kazan was sure they would be able to find another 
bowling alley tenant if and when the Lences Lane Inc. lease was terminated, the rest 
of the board remained skeptical. Given the lack of commercial tenants, though, the 
board was forced to carefully consider the application of Lences Lane Inc. 
Even though construction had concluded the completion and closing of the 
mortgage date had once again been pushed back a month, from September 1st, 1963 to 
October 1st, 1963 with the MRH agreeing to pay amortization for September.  The 
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construction costs of project had also exceeded the revised budget by another 
$2,500,000, and ILGWU agreed to advance the project another $2,500,000 in bonds 
at an interest rate of 5.25% per annum.  Even given the advance and the delay in 
closing, Kazan “was confident that [the] $2,500,000 was all that was needed to cover 
outstanding liabilities.”64  This was an extremely optimistic statement considering the 
disaster that was about to occur. 
On March 14, 1964 at 8:40 a.m. the power plant caught fire, shutting down the 
entire electrical system.  The power plant was damaged beyond repair.  Although 
insurance covered the loss and most of the repair work was done by late March, there 
was an additional cost of $184,475.44 to cover the installation of safety features.  
Problems with maintenance continued to be a problem.  In early April the board of 
directors admitted that it was difficult to obtain adequate supervisory personnel, and 
when combined with the settling of the ground and poor workmanship of contractors 
was responsible for the number of breaks in the water main.   Leaks within the 
plumbing system resulted in a number of flooded apartments.  The elevators also 
continued to break down.  This led the Westinghouse Electrical Company and the 
Herk Elevator Company to study the elevator to ascertain the causes of the frequent 
interruptions.  It was suggested that the fault might lay with the electrical motors used 
to operate the doors.  Luckily both the Westinghouse Electrical Company and the 
subcontractors agreed to cover any extra costs due to damage or faulty equipment. 65 
Income revenues persisted in being an issue as a large amount of commercial 
space remained vacant.  Kazan attempted to negotiate a lease with a tennis club, 
although members of the board hoped to turn the space into a public auditorium if the 
deal fell through.  Unfortunately for them Kazan was able to secure a long-term lease 
for the tennis club.  The RKO Theater, which had held its Gala opening in February 
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of the following year, also requested that the MRH share the cost of installing air-
conditioning; it was a request that was immediately denied.  
Although June ended with a surplus of $60,000 for residential space, it was 
expected that the commercial space would incur a deficit.  Part of the surplus may 
have been due to the fact that the housing company had, according to a tenant-
cooperator and ILGWU member, hired non-union labor maintenance staff and non-
skilled workers.  Non-skilled workers that, several tenant-cooperators argued, had 
failed to perform required maintenance repairs.66  
By early November, only 50% of the commercial space had been rented out, 
bringing in only $290,398 of $440,000, which was less than the maximum 
commercial income.  The limited amount of income meant that the management had 
to consider even more carefully any new purchases.  New switchboards had also been 
installed in the buildings and it was estimated that it would cost the project an extra 
$60,000 a year.  Other costs that had been added to the budget were the costs for the 
boiler for $79,476, fuel for $109,733, and electricity for $238,387, raising the 
carrying charge to $3.14 per room.  There was also a discussion by the board 
members about installing some type of security system because of the high amount of 
traffic that occurred in the apartments.  Thus, equity investments were increased by 
$100 per room.  With the additional charges, it was predicted that it would take 
several years before there was enough of a surplus to pay back the debentures bonds. 
By November 12th, 1964 the Board of Directors voted to raise the tenant-
cooperators carrying charges by 5%, effective as soon as possible to help raise funds.  
The Board also voted to apply to the ILGWU, the NYSTRF, the CB and the DD for a 
waiver of amortization for a year.  By late December the NYSTRF, the DD and the 
ILGWU had approved the waiver of amortization.  By January 1965, the amortization 
                                                
66 Ibid. 
 42 
was approved retroactively for January 1st, 1965.  The waiver effectively allowed the 
MRH to focus on the payment of construction debt.  Given the continued financial 
difficulties, Mr. Paul Kramer, the Comptroller of the Housing Company, advised an 
additional 5% carrying charge.  It was proposed that five committees be established to 
help facilitate the work of the board of directors, with summaries of their work 
published in the “Co-op Community News.” 
 On January 21st, Kramer's 5% increase in carrying charges was put into place.  
All incoming tenant-cooperators were also forced to purchase $100 debentures per 
room.  To raise additional funds, a campaign to sell 4% debentures was implemented 
by the Housing Company.  It was continued until April 1st after 281 cooperators 
bought debentures in the amount of $88,000. 
 Setbacks with the housing project continued and on February 13th the elevator 
broke down causing several people to suffer because of their inability to reach their 
apartments.  One man was forced to spend the night in a hotel and later ended up in 
the hospital because he was unable to get his medicine from his apartment.  The 
incident inspired him to run for the Board of Directors, although he lost.  Later he 
asserted that this was because a “day or two before the election... a “deal” had been 
made with the “communists” and that neither [he] nor any other independent could 
succeed” in winning office.67  He also claimed that the “breakdown occurred because 
management [particularly its head Abraham Bluestein had] paid no attention to 
complaints that both elevators needed repairs... [and that even though the] night 
before a man on duty [had] complained to maintenance... nothing was done until the 
next day.”68  Bluestein was later absolved of any fault by the board. 
 In the face of additional costs the cooperative attempted to reduce the budget 
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by investing in newer, more efficient technology.  The board’s installation of long-life 
filters for the heating and air conditioning were installed for $5,200 to reduce heating 
and air-conditioning to an estimated $2,500 per month.  This was the first of many 
environmental and energy saving steps undertaken by the Co-op.  
The budget continued to rise, though, as unforeseen costs appeared.  New two-
speed motors were placed in the cooling towers to reduce noise for a cost of $28,000.  
A four-station walkie-talkie communications system and alarm locks for the roof were 
also purchased for over $200,000 to curb unwanted and unattended non-residents.  To 
meet the initial costs, the board agreed to construct outdoor tennis courts for the 
Midtown Tennis Club in exchange for an increase in the lease.  Fortunately the MRH 
board was able to rent out the second floor of offices to Farkas & and the Co-Op 
Furniture Center moved into vacant commercial stores at an increase of $24,000 per 
year. 
Penn South Cooperative Credit Union begun to offer loans to tenant-
cooperators and employees of the housing project, and fifty-five tenant-cooperators 
had already borrowed $21,950,880 to pay for air conditioning.  Loans were offered at 
a monthly rate of 0.06%, “lower than any other bank in the City.”69   The staff of the 
bank was composed of a policy making board of seven directors, clerks, and 
bookkeepers, all of whom were unpaid volunteers.70 
Tenant problems occurred again in August when the city declared a major 
disaster declaration due to a water shortage and severely restricted water access to the 
cooperative.  Although Rochdale supported the cooperative with water from their 
private well, tenant-cooperators were limited in their use of water.  Tenant-
cooperators, who had to take baths for medical reasons, were asked to bring the water 
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down in drums next the incinerators to water the plants.  This frustration was coupled 
with management disputes and caused conflict during the 1966 mid-January annual 
stockholders meeting.  The majority of complaints were due to the numerous 
breakdowns and repairs that had occurred.  Many of tenants who were union members 
hope to address Stulberg with their grievances.  
Many of the MRH Board members argued that Stulberg handled the meeting 
“masterfully,” and whose  “[control] of [a] few dissidents was most effective.”71  
Although he was commended for his handling of the throng of disgruntled residents, 
the House Committee, chaired by David Smith, was of the opinion that Stulberg 
should not have conducted himself  “in the manner set forth in the House Committee 
communication,” and that “the disturbance at the beginning of the Stockholders' 
Meeting resulted from the reaction of some stockholders to the ‘campaign speeches’ 
implicit in the letters read by Mr. Stulberg at the beginning of the stockholders' 
meeting.”72  Ultimately, Smith “felt that Mr. Stulberg, by the temper and substance of 
his remarks on the House Committee report had insulted the Chairman of the House 
Committee”73  
 Board member David Gingold, on the other hand, “stated [that] there was an 
organized attempt to disrupt the Stockholders' Meeting and if it were not for the 
actions of Mr. Stulberg as Chairman the meeting could not have been carried out in 
order; and that the remark of the Chairman, “Now look here, are you drunk?” was 
addressed only to one person who was disrupting the meeting.”74  Samuel Hendel, 
another board member, also argued “that the House Committee communication 
moved in the direction of exacerbating the difference of opinion in the community 
                                                
71 Vincent Sozzi to Louis Stulberg April 12, 1966, ILGWU Collection, Kheel Center Archives, Cornell 
University. 
72 “Special Directors' Meeting of I.L.G.W.U. Houses, Inc.,” (1966), 4 
73 Ibid 5. 
74 Ibid. 
 45 
with respect to the meeting, and that, if the communication [by the House Committee] 
were addressed to the Board with the intent to have the Board censure the Chairmen, 
he would not approve of the communication in any respect.”75  Zimmerman also 
commented “the House Committee communication constituted an unjustifiable 
attempt to discredit the Chairman.”76  
 Even with the disagreement, Smith and Bluestein were quick to congratulate 
Stulberg on his election as the President of the ILGWU and acknowledge his 
“tremendous contributions.”  It also did not stop Bluestein from asking Stulberg to 
include the statement “And, incidentally, since the last Stockholders Meeting I have 
informed myself further about the duties and responsibilities of the House Committee 
at the ILGWU Cooperative Houses, and I am pleased to note that the House 
Committee is functioning in a responsible manner.”77  As Bluestein believed that “a 
sentence like [that could] bring to an end the tension that does exist and contribute 
toward greater harmony, calm and peacefulness in [the Cooperative] community.”78 
 Given the continual issues with maintenance the board advised that from time 
to time the House Committee recruit and train additional personnel.  The board also 
recommended that, to cover the extra costs incurred by various problems around the 
housing project that the cooperative join with other cooperatives to gain joint 
purchasing power on goods such as fuel, oil, elevator parts, and television 
maintenance.  In the meantime, the board increased the carrying charges to $4.50 to 
cover the gaps existing in the budget.  
 In late June problems with the maintenance continued when building two 
experienced a breakdown in the air-conditioning system, on the hottest weekend of 
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the year.  An electrical explosion caused electrical failure in all of building two.  
Although power was restored within forty-five minutes and people in elevators were 
quickly removed, the Chief Engineer of the Housing Company estimated that the air-
conditioning system could not be repaired before the Tuesday after.  It was an 
estimation that the Executive Committee severely disagreed with, ultimately costing 
the Chief Engineer his job.  Due to the distress caused by a combination of 
miscommunication, the fact that the tenant-cooperators were not informed of the 
problem, and not given a timetable for the repair, over one hundred tenant-
cooperators marched over to Bluestein's apartment causing a noisy demonstration 
outside of his door the night of the breakdown. 
 While the housing project had been able to avoid widening its streets, 
additional expenses were incurred by the city.  Over $85,000 “attributable to the 
recent increase in real estate and water and sewer rated, and to the imposition of the 
new City Income Tax,” was added to the budget.79  Given the extra expenses, the 
board foresaw difficulty in paying back the $300,000 debenture bonds, which were 
set to mature on the following April.  Multiple cost cutting measures were suggested 
at the October board meeting.  One proposal was looking in to a possible anti-trust 
suit against the company who had installed plumbing fixtures, in light of the 
indictments of multiple plumbing companies for price fixing.  The Board also 
suggested installing fluorescent lights into lobbies to decrease the cost of electricity. 
This move would save the project money in the long run, but caused an increase the 
deficit in the immediate future. 
 The Board estimated that in less than a year the cooperative would owe an 
additional $2,086,000 due to the maturity of the 5% ILGWU debentures bonds and 
their interest, the 4% tenant-cooperators bonds and their interest, and the Community 
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Services, Inc., fee.  It was also estimated that, under the current carrying charge 
structure, operating deficits would continue until the early 1970's 
 In late November 1966, Ostroff was elected as president replacing Kazan, who 
had retired in October.  Hendel was also elected to the position of Secretary, and the 
Szold law firm was retained for $8,000 per annum with semi-annual review.  The 4% 
cumulative income debentures held by tenant-cooperators were also converted into 
stock to decrease cost, while a 10% increase in carrying charges was approved for 
April 1st 1967.  It was believed that the “conversion of debentures into stock and for a 
rent increase, [was]... necessary in order to put the Housing Company on a sound 
financial footing within the next five years.”80  An allocation of additional 
maintenance staff was made to deal with “complaints of cleanliness in the halls and 
other public areas.”81 
 To deal with the ILGWU bond, which was set to mature at a cost of $425,000, 
the board of directors sent out a proposal to the ILGWU asking to pay back the 
principal interest of the debenture bonds over a three-year period.  The board was also 
informed that 65% of the tenant-cooperators were expected to voluntarily convert 
their 4% debentures into capitol stock, to which the board agreed to pay the interest.  
The carrying charges increased on April 1st, 1967 by 7.5%. 
 By April 18th, 1967, the General Executive Board of the ILGWU had agreed 
to allow the MRH to pay back the 5% debentures bonds in quarterly installments of 
$35,000 at an interest of 5% per annum commencing on July 10, 1967.  By May the 
Board had signed a broker deal with the city to sell more capital stock in the form of 
$50 debentures.  This would prove to be merely a stopgap measure, as a year later the 
MRH was forced to take out an additional loan of almost $2,000,000.  
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 The increase in debt was largely “due to the pressure of inflation, represented 
in increased real estate taxes, water and sewage taxes, the city corporation tax and 
higher costs of labor and supplies, [and the MRH was] unable to project enough 
capital to meet the deadlines to liquidate the balance of debt.” 82  Added to these costs 
was the requirement of the municipality-mandated improvements, such as the 
incinerator alterations.  It was estimated that the improvements and inflation would 
increase the mortgage from $1,800,000 to $1,850,000.  
 The expense forced the board to increase carrying charges by an additional 
5%.  By June, all of the loan institutions had agreed to increase the mortgage at a rate 
of 7.5% per annum in addition to a yearly 9% debt service, with a stipulation by the 
ILGWU that the union only be required to purchase 50% of the bonds.  The rest of the 
“D” bonds were split between the DD, with thirteen and a 25% of the loan, and the 
NYSTRF, with 36.25% of the loan.   To meet the additional debt, in November, the 
board raised the carrying charges by an additional 7.5%.  It was believed that the 
increase in the rate would bring an additional $308,600 per year to into the budget.  
This was a liberal estimate, considering New York City's surcharge obligations.  
Changes to the garbage disposal increased the budget by an additional $174,000.  To 
keep rent and carrying charges affordable, the Board of Estimate approved “retention 
of Penn South of 50% of surcharge amounts collected.” 83  
 The additional raises in carrying charges, though, proved to be inadequate in 
the face of inflation and by the mid-1972, the board voted to raise the rent by 10%.  
The Board of Estimate also agreed to adopt a resolution, which released the housing 
company from certain real estate taxes, if the housing company agreed to raise the 
rent by 10% on July 1, 1974 or by 7%, if the rent was raised retroactively on February 
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1st, 1973.  The Board members voted to retroactively change the date of the increase 
to July 1st of 1973 to cover the increase in fuel oil.  
 A month later, to raise more funds, the cooperative voted to lease commercial 
space to McDonald's for forty-one years.  The vote passed seven to eight with 1,170 
for, and eight hundred fifty cooperators against.  One of the tenant-cooperators, Irving 
Lewis, wrote to the ILGWU pleading with them to reverse the vote because of the 
“physical danger to the cooperators as well as the physical danger to the cooperative” 
owing to increased “traffic in front of the cooperative [which] would multiply and... 
[destroy] the ecological environment.”84 
 In August, the MRH applied for a one-year waiver of amortization, with a one 
and a half financing fee that would be added to balloon mortgage maturity.  The 
president, David Smith, argued that due to additional capital improvements, run-away 
inflation, and the desire to keep “carrying charges within a modest range because of 
the existence in [the] development of a great number of senior citizens and low and 
moderate income cooperator, among which [were] a sizable number of both retired 
and working teacher” the project had been experiencing severe cash flow.85  By 
December, both the ILGWU and the DD agreed to waive the amortization for 1974, 
with the DD agreeing to waive a total amount of $755,000.  Along with the one year 
of amortization the MRH board applies to the NYSTRF for additional funding in mid 
1973. 
 The MRH attempted to renegotiate the waiver of amortization with the help of 
the ILGWU, but Mr. Blum, the NYSTRF Mortgage officer, argued that they were not 
“in the business [of] subsiz[ing] the tenants... that the tenants had a good buy and, 
therefore, it was felt by the System that the need for additional money should be 
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passed along to them.”86 Unfortunately, in September, the NYSTRF denied the 
MRH’s request for funding.  Smith argued that the NYSTRF was under the wrong 
impression, and that the tenant-cooperators were of low and middle income with 61% 
of the residents having an income of between $3,000 and $12,000.  
Over 40% of the residents were sixty-five years or older with an additional 
10% between sixty-two and sixty-five years old.  Although Smith was right and a 
majority of tenant-cooperators were on a fixed income, 20% of them were over the 
permissible income totaling an additional $100,000 a year.87  By January of the next 
year, the NYSTRF had once again declined the MRH's request to waive a year's 
worth of amortization, but did not object to the DD and ILGWU's waiver.   The 
financial institutions agreed to a rate of 7.25% per annum; the total of which was to be 
included in the balance of the mortgage at its maturity. 
 By early 1974, the cooperative had adopted an energy conservation plan, 
which not only would become a “model for other developments,” but also dealt with 
the large energy costs that the project had been experiencing.88  The savings helped 
the project to pay taxes in advance. In early 1976, the board presented Mayor 
Abraham with a check for $200,000, the first of eight advances in taxes.  Six months 
later the Board of Estimates granted the housing project two “additional years of 
abatement of “extra” real estate taxes.”89  In August 1978, further abatements were 
approved for four and a half more years, saving the project of $1,000,000. 
Although the cooperative and its tenants were faced with serious setbacks both 
in physical and financial arenas it did not stop the amount of communal activity that 
occurred from the mid 1960’s on.  Through collective engagement the tenants met 
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both specific and overarching services that, at the time, were not being met by the 
local government due to a lack of capital. 
The majority of events and clubs began in 1965.  The Hudson Guild Art 
Center in building six began to offer its gallery and studio space for painting classes.  
Community rooms were opened for tenant run events such as yoga and outdoor art 
exhibitions and clubs like the volunteer home service club, which helped with 
window cleaning, floor waxing, light domestic work, babysitting, and organizing 
blood drives.  The blood drive was specifically planned after the death of a tenant-
cooperator.  Space under the Co-op market was turned into a meeting area and an 
activity room for groups of two to three hundred people.  An appeal was also made 
for the startup of a self-help program for people living alone, by a tenant-cooperator 
who wanted to express her gratitude for the help received by neighbors after she had 
spent time in the hospital.   
Community involvement in the housing project also helped with to provide 
necessary services for the cooperative.  Voluntary lobby patrols by residents began in 
April 1966; training with auxiliary police for tenant volunteers began a year and a half 
later.  Although there was not a large number of children, a play structure designed by 
tenant-cooperator Serge Gerstien, was added to building eight.  It was funded by the 
tenant-cooperators.  Other programs, like institutional welcome meetings for 
cooperators, were created to help retain a sense of community and allow new 
cooperators to get involved in current clubs and activities.90 Although there were 
major increases in the budget and carrying charges during the 1960’s and 1970’s 
because of repair costs, inflation, and a lack of commercial tenants, Penn South was 
able to provide for basic services through communal involvement. 
Even with budgetary issues Penn South was able to successfully deal with the 
                                                
90 Ibid. 
 52 
additional repair and inflation costs. At the same time the cooperative was able to 
provide services through community involvement that were not readily available from 
the city and would have, if not for the tenant volunteers and community oriented 
board, further weighed down the budget. The board implemented several strategies 
that allowed the project to retain its affordability until the 1980’s when the debt was 
restructured. Without the energy conservation plan, negotiation with the city, 
amortization negotiation, and sale of debentures Penn South would have been unable 
to meet its financial obligations. These financial strategies were only possible through 
the widespread collaboration between tenants, administration, Board members, 
creditors and the city. 
. 
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CHAPTER IV: TO PRIVATIZE OR NOT TO PRIVATIZE, THAT IS THE 
QUESTION, 1980’s TO 2000’s 
 
This chapter focuses on the multiple changes occurred in the mid-1980's 
through the early 21st Century.  The beginning focuses on the cooperative’s attempt to 
restructuring maturing debt, while the second half deals with the cooperative’s 
decision of whether of not to abolish its limited equity status.  The chapter also deals 
with the major improvements and repairs that the cooperative has undergone to bring 
the buildings up to current code and at the same time make the cooperative self-
sufficient.  
By 1985, when the first mortgage matured, the MRH took out a loan to cover 
the debt owed to the DD and NYSTRF, while renegotiating their loan with the 
ILGWU.   On March 15, 1985, to restructure the debt, the housing project signed an 
eight supplemental indenture selling “A” bonds in the amount of $10,802,373.15.  
The “A” bonds were split between the ILGWU who held $6,500,000 worth, the 
American Savings Bank (ASB) who held $1,303,373.14 worth, and the National 
Consumer Cooperative Bank who held $3,000,000 worth.  The ASB also held 
$1,842,459 worth of “B” bonds and $6,555,167 worth of “C” bonds.  The bonds were 
handed over for a total of $19,200,000, with the maturity date set for March 1st, 1990.  
 By November 1986, the ILGWU held all the “A” bonds, amounting to 
$6,000,000.  The ASB held $9,700,000 worth of “B” bonds.  The NCCB held 
$3,000,000 worth of “C” Bonds, while all of the series “D” bonds were paid off.  The 
board of the MRH attempted to renegotiate with the ILGWU for a mortgage with an 
interest rate of 9.5%, while the ASB offered to make an additional loan of 
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$11,600,000 at an interest rate of 9.5% over a thirty-year payout.  
 A year later the housing project had taken out an additional $1,000,000 capital 
investment loan, and in late March the MRH had increased the mortgage from 
$18,800,000 to $23,000,000 for repair and other capital improvements.  The increase 
in the mortgage was negotiated with the National Cooperative Bank (NCB), which 
also agreed to refinance the mortgage.  The MRH board believed that by renegotiating 
the mortgage with the National Cooperative Bank, it would be able to save 
considerable money.  Due to the fact that the NCB had received its Charter from 
Congress “they [were] not required to pay City or State taxes” allowing them to 
eliminate the excess cost of a “mortgage recording tax, which [added] approximately 
2.25 – 2.5%” more to a loan.91   Thus the NCB was able to offer the housing project a 
$23,000,000 loan to be paid back at a rate 7.18%.  It was rate lower than any the ASB 
would have been able to offer, because its loan was based on a Treasury note and not 
private market rates.  The loan effectively lowered their amortization rate to 9.86% 
per annum, freezing it in over a thirty-year period with a $5,000,000 per annum 
service fee.  
 By May 1st, the MRH had redeemed the bonds held by the American Savings 
Bank and the ILGWU, even though the ILGWU had attempted to renegotiate the loan 
for the MRH.  Even with the new loan, other costs such as a raise in taxes forced the 
project to increase the carrying charges by another 15%. 
 Along with the major refinancing that occurred in the mid-1980s, the housing 
board also undertook a major vote, which would help to determine whether or not the 
community would retain its affordability for the next twenty-five years.  In late 
October 1986, the cooperative voted on whether to apply to the city for twenty-five 
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years’ worth of tax abatements.  This was the first of many votes and one that would 
set the tone for further discussions surrounding the cooperative’s affordability.  The 
vote passed and on March 6th the MRH Board sent in an application to the HPD for 
the 25-year phase-in of real estate taxes.92  The application was approved merely two 
months later, allowing the project to retain its non-profit status. 
 There were many factors that determined not only why the housing board 
voted to remain affordable, but also why the city approved their application.  The first 
and most pressing issue for the tenant-cooperators was price.  “According to local 
realtors, the price of one-bedroom, apartment would likely soar from $9,200… to 
between $140,000 and $175,000, while carrying charges would increase from $280 to 
$400” if the housing project went private.93  David Smith, the housing president, 
estimated that the raise in pricing would “imperil about 75 percent of the current 
residents who [were] elderly and living on fixed incomes [and who] could not afford 
to pay full taxes all at once.”94  
The second reason, which was called heavy handed and antiquated by its 
opponents, was the moral imperative that the twenty-five year phase-in raised.95  
Cindy Freidmutter, an assistant attorney general of New York State claimed “well 
over 100,000 subsidized apartments in New York State that [were] similar to Penn 
South... [would have been] affected by it decision.”96  Ruth Lerner, an assistant 
commissioner of the Housing Preservation and Development Department, argued that 
because of its union background the housing cooperative was an “ideological leader 
of the nonprofit-cooperative movement in New York... therefore it [was] something 
of acid test for all the city's publicly assisted moderate-income housing project,” and 
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if the project went private “less idealistic housing projects [would] certainly follow 
suit.”97  Thus it was believed that if Penn South did not remain affordable, other, 
smaller cooperatives would follow in its footsteps steps and go private.  By 
maintaining affordability, residents and other officials believed that it could 
encourage other tentative cooperatives to do the same. 
 The question still remained, though, why the city was willing to “forgo [an 
estimated] $53 million in tax revenues if it extended [the project's] tax abatement for 
25 years.”98  It could be posited that one of the reasons the Board of Estimates was 
willing to approve the tax abatement was the relationship that the housing project had 
maintained with the city.  In late April 1987, the HPD had sponsored a citywide 
conference called “Caring for the Elderly at Home” for which the housing project had 
“played a decisive role in initiating the concept and planning.”99  
More importantly Penn South helped out during New York's financial crisis 
“when the city was practically begging people to pay their real estate taxes early in 
exchange for an 8 percent prepayment, Smith “convinced [the housing project] to pay 
its taxes early and forgo the discount.”  It was a move, which forced many of the 
residents “to borrow money to help the city out.”100  And only three months earlier, 
the project had made its twelfth consecutive annual prepayment of taxes worth 
$312,000.101  It also helped that the tax abatement was supported by powerful political 
players, such as Jay Mazur the President of the ILGWU, Mayor Koch, Comptroller 
Goldin, Council President Stein and Borough President Dinkins.102  The twenty-five 
year phase-in would set the tone for further tax breaks that the city would grant Penn 
South in the decades to follow.  
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The 1990's saw major changes to the housing project with the election of the 
first new president in over 21 years.  Jeff Dullea, who served as president from 1993 
to 1997. Under his appointment the cooperative opened a Youth Recreation Room, 
designating space behind building seven for the children of tenant-cooperators.  
Robert Silverstein, who served from 1997 to 2004, oversaw the negotiation of a new 
contract with the city, which gave the project “shelter rent tax” status, allowing the 
property tax assessment to be based on rent rather than assessed on the value of 
surrounding properties.103  This meant that even with inflation and the rise of 
surrounding property values, the cooperative's taxes would not be affected.  The 
contract, which was approved by over 80% of the cooperative, allowed the housing 
project to extend its tax abatement to 2022.  It was an agreement that allowed the 
cooperative to save around $10,000,000 per year.  Walter Mankoff, Penn South’s 
treasurer, estimated that without the tax abatement the cooperative would have had to 
implement a “50% carrying charge increase,” an increase larger than any other the 
cooperative had experienced.104  
 Silverstein's successor, Irma Lobal, the first female president of the 
cooperative, continued to work with the city renegotiating the terms of the contract, 
which allowed funds to be raised for major improvements.  To do this, equity was 
doubled on the first sale of apartments “with the proviso that half of the equity would 
be deposited in a capital improvement fund for the future.”105  One of the 
improvements was the replacement of elevators that eliminated skip stops.  Luckily, 
the housing project “ha[d]n't had the difficulties of, for instance, Co-op City, which 
had to close most of its garages because of structural problems” and the “ground 
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above [being] saturated with water and the drains [being] clogged.”106  Morris 
Benjamin, the current president, who began his tenure in 2006, implemented further 
renovations projects.  Talk about replacing the development's entire heating and 
cooling system (HVAC) started in 2009, and in 2011, the city helped to provide 
further funding in exchange for the cooperative voting favorable to extend the tax 
abatement to 2030.   It was a deal, which was approved by 87%.107  Those who 
wanted to go private mainly opposed the deal because they hoped to leave behind a 
larger inheritance for their relatives, or because they were unsure about the terms of 
the city's deal.  Even though the cooperative has voted to remain limited equity until 
2030 and secured funds for the HVAC renovation, residents still fear that funds for 
necessary maintenance and repairs will, in the future, dry up. 
 Even though Penn South voted to remain private and has been able to remain 
affordable with help from the city, it still faces pressures both internally and 
externally to privatize as the cost of maintenance becomes more burdensome and the 
demographics of the cooperative shifts. Although it has taken various steps to remain 
inexpensive through self-reliant and energy efficient renovations, other funds are 
necessary. The next chapter is a suggestion of alternative partners and approaches that 
might be able to help support Penn South’s affordability. 
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CHAPTER V: A QUESTION OF AFFORDABILITY, THE PRESENT AND 
BEYOND 
 
 This chapter will look at possible partners and strategies that can help Penn 
South find ways to remain affordable, specifically focusing on the way historic 
designation and preservation can be beneficial and provide savings in costs. It will 
also identify possible partners and stakeholders in the community whom in one way 
or another have a vested interest in preserving Penn South’s history. 
 New York City and Chelsea has become “a place for [only] the very, very 
wealthy [and] the very poor.”  This is evidenced not only by the Whole Foods a few 
blocks down from Penn South, but also by the number of applicants who apply for a 
spot on Penn South's waiting list.   In 2008 there were over 20,000 applications sent in 
in response to only “2,000 [vacant] spots on the waiting list for Penn South.”108  The 
waiting list is continually packed given that “only about 150 [apartments] become 
available in any given year” since most of the tenants prefer to age in their 
apartments.109  The propensity of tenant-cooperators to keep their apartments is due, 
by and large, to two factors.  
 The first factor is that affordable housing in the city, especially in Manhattan, 
is difficult to acquire.  Although affordable housing is included in large housing 
projects, the units only make up a small percentage of the units that are actually 
available.  Even though it can be asserted that allowing for “only about 20% of the 
apartments [to be] set aside as affordable housing” in these large projects creates an 
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income mix, the tenants are removed from necessary amenities that would be 
provided by low income housing administration or in the surrounding areas.110  Since 
Penn South is a project devoted solely to a mix of moderate to low-income tenant-
cooperators, it is by its very nature focused on providing affordable activities and 
services for its residents.  This is made possible because Penn South has a staff that 
concentrates on and has experience working with low-income tenants, unlike market 
rate cooperatives who “only care about having a doorman.”111 The Board can also 
rent out commercial space to meet the needs of its tenant-cooperators. 
 Many affordable cooperatives have in the last twenty years voted to go 
private, which Brendan Kenan, the general manager of Penn South, says is “crying 
shame... because once they’re gone, they’re gone and there’s no bringing them 
back.”112  And although many of the buildings in the area were previously denounced 
as slums, " Chelsea has become an upscale neighborhood, and the old brownstones 
nearby have greatly increased in value."113  Due to privatization and rent hikes brought 
on by gentrification, the city has sought “to preserve existing middle-income 
apartments, like the thousands [of apartments] in Mitchell-Lama complexes and 
similar affordable-housing projects that were built from the mid-1950s to the mid-
1970s,” giving Penn South “income and purchase limits similar to those at Mitchell-
Lama projects.”114  The only drawback, according to critics, being that “under Penn 
South’s rules, [tenants] must sell the apartment back to the co-op... [only repaying the 
initial fee], plus a share of the amortization on the complex’s underlying mortgage, 
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but no interest and nothing for inflation or appreciation.”115  
 Although the tax abatements and non-profit status allows for Penn South to 
retain its affordability, it makes raising money for repairs and replacements an 
extremely complicated procedure.  To help raise money for repairs the MRH has 
taken out loans from the AFL-CIO Housing Investment Trust (HIT).  The MRH had 
taken out a loan of $33,000,000 from the AFL-CIO HIT in 2003 to help restructure 
debt.116  It is “a fixed-income investment company registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission... manages $4.6 billion in assets for over 365 investors, which 
include union and public employee pension plans... [and] invests primarily in 
government and agency insured and guaranteed multifamily mortgage-backed 
securities.”117  It was established by the American Federation Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations, an organization that is affiliated with the ILGWU's 
successor, UNITE HERE.  Currently Penn South is remediating asbestos from the 
walls, using the funding provided by the AFL-CIO HIT.118  
 The AFL-CIO HIT provided “$134 million for the $151 million [HVAC] 
project through the purchase of a Fannie Mae mortgage-backed security... working 
closely with the New York City Housing Development Corporation and Housing 
Preservation Department, which [provided] subordinate loans for the [HVAC] 
project.”119  The loans, which were dependent on Penn South's agreement to extend 
the city's tax abatements until 2030.  The HIT loan was also “undertaken to 
restructure debt, while maintaining affordability.”  Luckily besides the replacement of 
elevator and heating and cooling parts, most of the superblock structures built in the 
1950's and 1960's only face minor repairs problems and therefore require less 
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maintenance than housing built in the 1970’s and 1980’s.120 
 Like Penn South, other low income and affordable superblock housing, most 
of which are associated with the New York City Housing Authority or NYCHA, have 
had to make up for a deficit incurred by repairs and upkeep.  Since tenants who on 
average make less than $25,000 and pay around $425 per month occupy the projects, 
funds for repairs are scarce.  To make up for the projected deficit, NYCHA has been 
attempting to transform some of the 'unused' land that it owns, favoring infill 
development, which turns empty space on projects like the Astoria, Fulton, and Smith 
Houses into market rate commercial space.  
Although code restrictions limit development in certain areas, NYCHA has 
already started to look at the development of parking lots and other open space into 
shops and mixed income dwellings, even at constructing more floors on top of 
existing buildings to take advantage of the floor area ratio of the site.  The plans for 
development have brought up issues for residents’, who fear that green space will be 
taken away from the local community.  There are also concerns regarding aesthetics 
and that the development will also disrupt the original design and flow of the project, 
fracturing the architect's original vision of the project as a single unit.  It is a factor 
that makes intact superblock constructions like Penn South scarce. 
 Aside from Penn South's rarity as an affordable, intact superblock cooperative, 
its uniqueness lies in its ties to the Garment District.  Many have decried the loss of 
industry in New York City, especially in the Garment District because of the “spatial 
and economic shift, significant vertical urban factories have developed [in New York 
City] in the past ten years.”121  The Fashion Center Business Improvement District, or 
the BID, which “was established in 1993 to improve the quality of life and economic 
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vitality of Manhattan’s Garment District” has helped to “[invest] over $77 million in 
the area.”122  It is composed of five hundred seventy-five property owners and over 
6,500 businesses, with the goal of stimulating the fashion industry in the New York 
City Garment District through art and awareness.  Together with the Design Trust for 
Public Space, they published the Making Midtown report, which stated that the 
fashion and garment industries “represent 28% of New York City’s manufacturing, 
and [that] the Garment District alone generates $2.1 billion in revenue for the City 
and employs over 7,000 people,” on average offering better paying jobs than those 
provided by the service industry.”123 
 The study was produced as a by-product of the current rezoning concerns 
surrounding the Garment District.  In 1987, to preserve industry in the Garment 
District, the city instituted a one to one square foot-zoning rule, essentially creating 
the Garment Center Special District by “discourag[ing] property owners from 
converting space in their building from manufacturing to offices or other uses.”124 
Twenty year later, according to architect Jeorg Schwartz, “the City looked at the 
Garment District and  [said], “You’ve got about 8 million square feet reserved for 
manufacturing in this district, but you’re not using 8 million square feet.”125  This was 
followed by a proposal by the city to change the square foot zoning ratio from one to 
one to one to six, leaving approximately 1,000,300 square-feet reserved for the 
fashion industry.  The Making Midtown report showed that the amount of space was 
insufficient with “1.1 million square feet [needed for] manufacturing... another 
600,000 square feet [needed for] associated suppliers... [and] another 2.5 million 
square feet [needed for] other fashion uses, such as showrooms, designers’ 
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workspaces, and sample rooms for designers themselves.”126  
Penn South, which houses numerous retired garment workers and was built to 
provide a short commute, provides an important link to the Garment District.  It's 
preservation is vital to the overall preservation of the Garment District, which 
continues to be at risk as “asking rents in the area are rising, and nearby development 
is bringing more office, residential, hotel and retail use, much of [which is] non-
fashion [or garment] related.”127  The preservation of Penn South raises awareness 
about the history of the Garment District and the garment unions, both of which were 
vital to the garment making and fashion markets in New York City.  
 More impressive than the role that Penn South has played in shaping the 
Garment District is the role that its inhabitants played in shaping the city and the state.  
Dr. Samuel Hendel was the author of Charles Evans Hughes and the Supreme Court 
and a professor of political science at the City College of New York.  Dr. Welsey A. 
Horchkiss served the General Secretary for Higher Education at United Church of 
Christ.  Karen Smith acted as a State Supreme Court Justice.  Irving Lewis served as 
an executive on the AFL-CIO and as a delegate of the NYC Central Labor Council.  
The list does not include all of the countless teachers and garment laborers, all of 
whom worked to make Penn South an exemplary community.  A community, that like 
its residents, has sought to help both neighbors in the cooperative and Chelsea. 
 Hurricane Sandy is but one example of when the cooperative has reached out 
to help its neighbors in a time of need.  Right after the storm, when much of lower 
Manhattan and New York City was left devastated and without electrical power, Penn 
South “because [they] had [their] lights on after the floods... [was] able to open [their] 
community rooms for people in the neighborhood to get some warmth and water and 
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to recharge their phones and computers.128  They also reached out “to local political 
leaders to get a generator for the Fulton Houses, a public-housing project in Chelsea,” 
and “got [their] local Gristedes supermarket to provide food to nearby public-housing 
residents,” all because it is the “cooperative way.” Penn South’s staff and residents 
jointly organize events focused on goodwill and civic engagement.  It is a community 
in which residents are apt to “[know] every single person on [their] floor."129  The 
services provided by the Penn South community and administration fill a gap that the 
majority of lower income residents are unable to afford individually.  
In 1986, Penn South “became the country’s first Naturally Occurring 
Retirement Community, or NORC... an official designation for housing that wasn't 
built for elderly people but is occupied by enough of them to become eligible for 
special grants.”130  This designation was largely possible because of the study 
commission by David Smith in 1970.  The then president hired a sociologist to pose 
as an air-conditioning maintenance worker.  He found that “60 or so residents who 
were having difficulty coping with everyday demands because of some physical or 
mental infirmity.”131  By the 1980's Penn South claimed to have “both the largest 
share of elderly people of any naturally occurring retirement community [or 
community not specifically designed to house elderly people] in New York City as 
well as the most diverse program of supportive services."132 
 To help those elderly who were struggling to live alone in their apartments, 
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Penn South renovated the thirty-two hundred square-feet in the basement of 290 
Ninth Avenue for the Penn South Program for Seniors.  Smith recruited Selfhelp, a 
nonprofit social services agency, to operate the program.  He funded the program with 
help from the United Jewish Appeal-Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New 
York, with anonymous donors that contributed $1 million.133  Residents also 
supported the program by endowing their apartment to cooperative.  Residents were 
offered services through a voluntary “increase [in] monthly carrying charges… to pay 
for the health, education, recreation and social service programs, which are provided 
by a nurse, two case workers, two part-time social workers, and volunteers.”134  The 
carrying charges also covered things like “free screenings, lectures, flu shots, and so 
on for its senior citizens.”135  Establishing the program and recruiting Selfhelp allowed 
Penn South to provide care which could “bridge the gray area between government 
and private responsibility,” supporting “the growing number of elderly people who 
prefer to grow old in their own homes.”136  It also made Penn South a leader in the 
field of elder care, helping a population who is more vulnerable than others when 
living alone.  In addition to the services offered, multiple amenities in the surrounding 
area make Penn South an exceptional place to live.  “Blocks that comprise [the 
project] support diverse buildings including entertainment, grocery, school, church, 
and medical office facilities.”137  
 Even though the surrounding areas offer a diversity of activities and services, 
as the neighborhood is gentrified by wealth, elder resident will have to expand their 
search for affordable amenities.  The main worry for residents though is that the 
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“rising costs in New York City may mean a future where the complex won't have 
enough money for maintenance and repairs.”138  Preservation can help to lessen the 
cost burden of repairs that Penn South will face in the future, helping to retain 
affordability if the cooperative is unable or unwilling to accept funds from other HITs 
or private banks. 
 Historic designation is undertaken, and in some cases prevented, by the owner, 
but given the amount of care and pride that is taken in Penn South by its residents, it 
would be highly unlikely if the cooperative did not vote to designate the cooperative.  
Given its history and residents, Penn South is a prime candidate for designation, after 
which , the cooperative would be eligible for the “20% credit for… rehabilitation,” a 
10% increase over a non-historic building under the Tax Reform Act of 1976.139  
Using the tax credits could cover a whole host of “expenditures [from] the repair or 
installation of walks, gates, fences, and other site improvements” to the “addition of a 
new heating and cooling system and the replacement of other mechanical equipment 
(excluding elevators).”140  
The tax credits would help to recoup funds for substantial rehabilitations and 
also provide incentives for Community Development Corporations to invest.  By 
making “equity and debt investments in corporations or projects designed primarily to 
promote community welfare” the CDC would be able to attain a better rating from the 
federal government and bolster it’s standing in the community.141  Although the 
federal rating system does not penalize a CDC for low ratings, a high rating would 
make the CDC a more appealing financial partner, especially within the community. 
 Aside from the financial gain, there are also the abstract benefits that come 
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from designating a building.  Not only does designation “provide the brick-and-
mortar link to a community's past and symbolize a community's growth and 
prosperity,” it connects to the project to larger themes in the city's history.142  Penn 
South has a long, rich history, which not only highlights the city’s union and garment 
roots, but also liberal policies, which helped to usher in and grow the middle class.  
Perhaps most importantly, designating Penn South can demonstrate that 
preservation can assist affordability, helping those in need of funds for renovation and 
rehabilitation, without raising the property taxes beyond a manageable level for the 
owner.  Preserving affordable housing complexes like Penn South and using historic 
tax credits can take preservation back from the naysayers, who blame it for issues 
such as gentrification.  Penn South's non-profit and tax shelter status would shield the 
cooperative from the increase in property taxes that occurs on designated buildings 
that are rehabilitated and renovated with historic tax credits.  Although the 
reassessment in property taxes that occurs five years after the renovation is meant to 
recoup the tax credits, Penn South would not be affected given it “shelter rent tax” 
statues.  Designation of Penn South would help to preserve not only its buildings and 
grounds but also the legacy of its tenant and its founders, affordability.  
 In recent years the Penn South community has been undergoing a tremendous 
transformation, as every year at least “150 apartments... [are] vacated involuntary.”143 
According to Walter Mankoff, the current treasurer and a resident of the cooperative, 
since 1971, the apartments that are 'involuntary' vacated are quickly filled with tenant-
cooperators that are in most cases younger and more diverse than the tenants that they 
are replacing.  Penn South's connection to labor unions is quickly disappearing and 
designation, although unable to stem the tide of change, would ensure that not only 
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the union legacy but also the garment, affordability and community legacies 
continued on, even as demographics changed.  
 Although Penn South is facing various budget increases due to repairs costs 
and increasing property values, the coop has several opportunities and partners that 
can help it to raise the funds needed to cover the extra expenditures.  One such avenue 
of funding is designation.  It would be a pretty uncomplicated process given that the 
cooperative presents several unique facets of New York City’s history.  The 
cooperative has strong ties to the Garment Industry, which today is still a vital part of 
the city’s economy.  It is also part of a long history of union housing, which has 
helped to house thousands of teachers, labors, and other middle class professionals. 
More importantly, perhaps is its place in American urban history.  Like other mid-
century modern, super-bloc constructions it is often regarded with disdain because of 
its association with urban renewal.  Yet Penn South, for all its complicated history, is 
an important part of architecture and planning history and therefore is a prime 
candidate for designation. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 As briefly mentioned in the conclusion of the last chapter, Penn South has 
suffered from a preservation standpoint because of its association with urban renewal.  
This thesis is an attempt to recognize and honor the historic and positive aspects of 
superblock projects from a preservationist standpoint. 
The construction of the Penn South cooperative acted as a catalyst for 
redevelopment in the surrounding Chelsea neighborhoods in the early 1960’s, and that 
redevelopment sparked one of the most infamous preservation battles in New York 
City, the battle for Charles F. McKim's Beaux Arts Pennsylvania Station.  Many of 
the city’s unions favored the project, believing that the construction of a new Penn 
Station terminal, offices, hotel, and the Madison Square Garden Arena would 
revitalize the stagnant area and bring in more jobs.  Louis Broido, the Commissioner 
of Commerce and Industrial Development, praised Penn South, early on, as a model 
example of redevelopment and urged for further development to capitalize on its 
success: 
 “The ILGWU improvement is one of the finest examples of 
housing projects by an important and intelligent labor union group in 
the country and it would be helpful to that project itself to have in 
the immediate area large enterprises of the kind projected where 
good opportunity of employment might be available within walking 
distance to many persons living in that area, particularly young 
people coming out of trade and technical schools, general schools 
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and colleges.” 
The push for development meant the destruction of Pennsylvania Station and 
by late October of 1963 demolition began.  So incensed were artist, architects, 
planners, etc. over the loss of an architectural gem like the Pennsylvania Station that 
laws to strengthen preservation were enacted after its demolition.  Today 
preservationists have begun to focus on the high rate of demolition that concrete 
structures face.  This thesis is a study of one such building. 
Although modernism and it's massively scaled productions did not see an 
official decline until the early 1970s, modernist projects, in light of the destruction of 
Penn Station, began to be met with prejudice by the public and planners.  It didn't help 
that by the late 1960s, projects like Pruitt Igoe had stigmatized affordable housing 
developments built in the modern style as breeding grounds for criminals, destitution 
and federal debt.  Instead of concentrated superblock constructions, the federal 
government has encouraged private development to incorporate affordable housing 
through tax incentives.144  
Penn South is not only one of the final individual superblock projects to be 
constructed during the cooperatives' golden age, but it is also one that has proved to 
be successful in both providing continual affordable housing.  Thus this thesis is a 
chronicle of Penn South’s history, recounting it struggle with funding and 
highlighting its decision to remain affordable even when faced with multiple 
incentives to become market rate. 
Penn South was in some ways a replication if not an extension of other 
cooperative projects with the same architect and same staff, bulk contracts and shared 
costs, but its commitment to affordability has set it apart.  Tenants, the board, and the 
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administration at Penn South has actively sought out ways to retain affordability 
unlike other union funded cooperatives such as the Amalgamated Dwellings, Hillman 
Housing, East River Housing and Seward Park Housing, cooperative that decided to 
go private in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, quadrupling their initial investment.  
All of this bespeaks of a community that is not only instilled with optimistic 
liberalism, but one that also unceasingly practices it.  Today, Penn South still 
continues to help not only its resident but also its neighbors.  By connecting Penn 
South with non-profits that work with the elderly and the Garment District, the 
cooperative can build partnerships that will help it to remain affordable.  Also, by 
designating the cooperative, tax credits can help to make loan for renovation and 
rehabilitation manageable. Penn South is becoming rare not only from an affordable 
standpoint but also from a design standpoint.  
The historic affordable housing superblock form is disappearing not only 
because of private activity but also because of public intervention. The Housing 
Authority is New York City is attempting to make their housing stock more 
profitable. This means intervening in superblock affordable housing complexes to 
take advantage of their extra space, and ultimately destroying the historic flow and 
arrangement of these developments. Thus it is important to preserve the Penn South 
cooperative not only for its affordability, but also for is place in design and urban 
history. 
 Along with strategies for retaining Penn South’s affordability, there have been 
various issue and questions that have been raised in relation to the cooperative. Due to 
limited time and other constraints, it would be helpful to undertake a survey to 
correctly determine the change in demographics that is occurring as new cooperators 
move in.  Walter Mankoff, the current Penn South treasurer and a resident since 1971, 
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has stated that there has been shift in demographics that overall tends to show an 
increase in people of color, younger tenants and tenants with children.  As result, 
another matter to be examined is the shift in attitude that will occur when tenants who 
have no union connection become the majority.  
 The information provided by the changing demographics would also help to 
shed light on how newer tenants are adjusting to living in the cooperative. Given that 
the new residents seem to be a younger in age and with some caring for children, the 
activities and programs sponsored internally by the community and the administration 
will have to undergo changes to cater the changing nature of the tenants. Although, I 
suspect that the size of the apartments will not be an issue for families given that 
many of the units have two to three bedrooms. More importantly, though, I believe a 
study of these new tenants will uncover if they are in favor of retaining affordability 
and the cooperative’s limited equity status or whether they would prefer instead to go 
private. Such a study would help to determine the lifespan of Penn South’s 
affordability and ways in which the administration might encourage future 
affordability. 
 Another issue, which ties into the overall affordability of the area but has not 
been directly addressed, which I would like to have tackled if given more time is Penn 
South’s commercial tenants. The fact that Penn South owns commercial real estate in 
Chelsea puts the cooperative in a unique position to provide affordability in other 
areas besides housing. A major issue for the cooperative has been the skyrocketing 
property prices and taxes in Chelsea, which have forced out smaller, more affordable 
‘mom and pop’ stores in favor of larger more expensive chains like Whole Foods and 
Starbucks. Penn South, though, has the ability to artificially retain smaller, more 
affordable stores by virtue of its real estate holdings. Retaining affordable amenities 
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in the area is necessary so that low-income residents are not priced out of their 
neighborhood, especially for elderly tenants who have issues with mobility. The 
alienation of low-income consumers in mixed and high-income areas is a major issue 
that needs to be addressed, if not limited-equity and other low-income housing 
strategies will only be able to act as a band-aid for affordability. 
Other questions within the narrative that have arisen are largely due to the fact 
that a majority of documents in archives are union related and therefore lack a bulk of 
correspondence between other parties that are not related.  Documents from 
individuals outside of the union and particularly documents from the 1980s, 1990s, 
and later and have been scarce.  Thus it is not possible to substantiate certain claims, 
for example, about who was at fault for the continuous breakdowns in power and 
whether or not Lieberman was paid his full fee by Kazan and the Mutual 
Redevelopment Housing Corporations. Given more time, it also would be helpful to 
extrapolate and collate all of the financial data, which spans the last ten years of the 
cooperatives history. 
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Illustration 1: Photo of the court from an apartment window of the Amalgamated 
Cooperative Apartments. From ‘A Successful Experiment: Amalgamated 
Demonstrates Feasibility of Better Housing,’ The American Hebrew, Vol. 1, No. 22 
(New York City:  October 17, 1930), 657. 
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Illustration 2: Photo of Kindergarten Classes offered as part the Cooperative’s social 
programs. From ‘A Successful Experiment: Amalgamated Demonstrates Feasibility 
of Better Housing,’ The American Hebrew, Vol. 1, No. 22 (New York City:  October 
17, 1930), 647. 
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Illustration 3: Photo of the Garden Court at the Amalgamated Cooperative 
Apartments in Moshulo Parkway, New York City, 1930. From ‘A Successful 
Experiment: Amalgamated Demonstrates Feasibility of Better Housing,’ The 
American Hebrew, Vol. 1, No. 22 (New York City:  October 17, 1930).
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Illustration 4: Photo of Typical Boiler Room Installation in the Cooperative 
Apartment Houses. From ‘A Successful Experiment: Amalgamated Demonstrates 
Feasibility of Better Housing,’ The American Hebrew, Vol. 1, No. 22 (New York 
City:  October 17, 1930). 
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Illustration 5:  Photo of Kazan, 1953. From ‘Home for America,’ Justice (New York 
City, 1953), 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 6: Photo of United Housing Foundation Logo. From The Story of The 
ILGWU Cooperative Houses, (United Housing Foundation:  New York City), 36. 
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Illustration 7: Photo of the Seward Park Development. From The Story of the Seward 
Park Cooperative, (United Housing Foundation, New York City:  March 8, 1961), 11. 
 
 
 
Illustration 8: Photo of Seward Park Housing Cooperative building. From The Story of 
the Seward Park Cooperative, (United Housing Foundation, New York City, March 
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8, 1961), 3. 
 
 
Illustration 9: Photo of ‘Typical’ Living Room of ILGWU Cooperatives. From Harry 
Rubenstein, Justice, (Kheel Archives, New York City). 
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Illustration 10: Photo of ‘Typical’ Kitchen for ILGWU Cooperatives. From Harry 
Rubenstein, Justice, (Kheel Archives, New York City). 
 
 
 
Illustration 11: Picture of the Penn South Plan. From The Story of The ILGWU 
Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 4. 
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Illustration 12: Picture of the Penn South Floor Plan. From The Story of The ILGWU 
Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 11.  
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Illustration 13: Photo of Two and a half and Three Room Apartments. From The Story 
of The ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 
11. 
 
 85 
 
Illustration 14: Photo of Three and Three and a half Room Apartments. From The 
Story of The ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York 
City), 11. 
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Illustration 15: Photo of Three and a half and Four Room Bedrooms. From The Story 
of The ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 
11. 
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Illustration 16: Photo of Four and a half and Five Room Apartments. From The Story 
of The ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 
11. 
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Illustration 17: Photo of Six and a half Room Apartment. From The Story of The 
ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 11. 
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Illustration 18: Picture of the Ventilation for Penn South. From The Story of The 
ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 12. 
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Illustration 19: Photo of Housing Relocation Offices. From The Story of The ILGWU 
Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 8.  
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Illustration 20: Photo of Penn South application deposits. Coutresy of the Kheel 
Archives. 
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Illustration 21: Photo of the Penn South Plan at the Dry Dock Savings Bank. From 
1962 to 1987 Penn South 25th Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining in Chelsea,  (New 
York City, 1987),   
 
 
Illustration 22: Photo of Site during Demolition. From 1962 to 1987 Penn South 25th 
Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining in Chelsea,  (New York City, 1987),   
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Illustration 23: Photo of Test Borings. From The Story of The ILGWU Cooperative 
Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 15. 
 
  
Illustration 24: Photo of Site Demolition. From The Story of The ILGWU Cooperative 
Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 15. 
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Illustration 25: Photo of Excavation of Foundations. From The Story of The ILGWU 
Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 15. 
 
 
Illustration 26: Photo of Temporary Concrete Mixer on Site. From The Story of The 
ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 16. 
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Illustration 27: Photo of Concrete Foundations on Building Five. From The Story of 
The ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 16. 
 
Illustration 28: Photo of Brickwork. From The Story of The ILGWU Cooperative 
Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 16. 
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Illustration 29: Photo of Buildings Under Construction. From The Story of The 
ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 16. 
 
Illustration 30: Photo of Site Under Construction. Courtesy of the Kheel Archives 
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Illustration 31: Photo of the Interior of the Central Power Plant. From The Story of 
The ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 14. 
 
Illustration 32: Photo of Installation of Heat and Air Control for Individual Units. 
From The Story of The ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation 
(New York City), 17. 
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Illustration 33: Photo of Penn South from an Aerial View. Courtesy of the Kheel 
Archives. 
 
 
Illustration 34: Photo of Penn South Seeding and Landscape process. From The Story 
of The ILGWU Cooperative Houses, United Housing Foundation (New York City), 
14. 
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Illustration 35: Photo of JFK, LBJ and Eleanor Roosevelt in front a Penn South 
building. Photo of Courtesy of the Kheel Archives. 
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Illustration 36: Photo of Speaker at Penn South Dedication with JFK in the front row. 
Courtesy of the Kheel Archives. 
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Illustration 37: Photo of Dubinsky greeting JFK infront of waiting crowd. Courtesy of 
the Kheel Archives. 
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Illustration 38: Photo of Dubinsky and JFK talking. Courtesy of the Kheel Archives. 
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Illustration 39: Photo of Kennedy speaking at the Dedication with Eleanor Roosevelt 
to the side. Courtesy of the Kheel Archives. 
  
Illustration 40: Photo of Cooperative Supermarket. From 1962 to 1987 Penn South 
25th Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining in Chelsea,  (New York City, 1987), 24. 
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Illustration 41: Photo of School Children learning about the Supermarket. From 1962 
to 1987 Penn South 25th Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining in Chelsea,  (New York 
City, 1987), 25. 
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Illustration 42: Photo of Community Garden at Penn South. From 1962 to 1987 Penn 
South 25th Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining in Chelsea,  (New York City, 1987), 
27. 
 
 
Illustration 43:Photo of Art Class Students. From 1962 to 1987 Penn South 25th 
Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining in Chelsea,  (New York City, 1987), 20. 
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Illustration 44: Dave Smith escorting visitors from the People’s Republic of China. 
From 1962 to 1987 Penn South 25th Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining in Chelsea,  
(New York City, 1987), 22. 
 
 
Illustration 45: Photo of Cooperative Repairs. From 1962 to 1987 Penn South 25th 
Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining in Chelsea,  (New York City, 1987), 12. 
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Illustration 46: Photo of New York City’s Board of Estimates. From 1962 to 1987 
Penn South 25th Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining in Chelsea,  (New York City, 
1987), 14. 
 
 
Illustration 47: Photo of Penn South supporters at Board Estimate hearing. From 1962 
to 1987 Penn South 25th Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining in Chelsea,  (New York 
City, 1987), 17. 
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Illustration 48: Photo of Celebration of the Twenty-five year Real Estate Taxes at 
Penn South. From 1962 to 1987 Penn South 25th Anniversary Journal: A Silver Lining 
in Chelsea,  (New York City, 1987), 16. 
 
 
 
Illustration 49: Photo of Celebration Rally for Residents in honor of keeping Penn 
South affordable. From 1962 to 1987 Penn South 25th Anniversary Journal: A Silver 
Lining in Chelsea,  (New York City, 1987), 3. 
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Illustration 50: Photo of Individual businesses in and around the Fashion Center BID 
near Penn South. From Sarah Williams, “Proximity is Creativity: Unlocking the 
Value of the Garment District,” Urban Omnibus, (New York City: November 14, 
2012). 
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Illustration 51: Map of Penn South in proximity to amenities. From Making Midtown, 
(New York City: Design Trust for Public Space, 2012), 3. 
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Illustration 52: Photo of Infill plan for Affordable Housing superblock project. From 
Ben Abelman,  “Preserving Public Housing + Development,” (New York City 
Housing Authority: NYC, June 27th, 2012). 
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Illustration 53: Photo of Development for Retail Space in NYCHA’s Fulton Housing. 
From Ben Abelman,  “Preserving Public Housing + Development,” (New York City 
Housing Authority: NYC, June 27th, 2012).
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Illustration 54: Photo of Available area for development in NYCHA Housing project. 
From Ben Abelman,  “Preserving Public Housing + Development,” (New York City 
Housing Authority: NYC, June 27th, 2012). 
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LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Bond Holders145 
Series of 
Bond 
No. of Bonds Principal Amount Registered in the Name of 
Bond Holders 
A A-1 50,000.00 Amalgamated Ladies 
Garment Cutters Union, 
ILGWU Local 10 
A A-2 25,000.00 Waterproof Garment 
Worker Union Local 20, 
ILGWU 
A A-3 50,000.00 Dressmakers Union 
ILGW Local 22 
A A-4 50,000.00 Skirt & Sportswear 
Workers' Union ILGWU 
Local 23 
A A-5 25,000.00 Corset & Brasziere 
Workers Union ILGWU 
Local 23 
A A-6 100,000.00 Undergarment & Negligee 
Workers Union, ILGWU 
Local 62 
A A-7 100,000.00 Children's Dress, Infants 
Wear, House Dress & 
Bathrobe Makers Union, 
ILGWU Local 91 
A A-8 25,000.00 Office & Distribution 
Employees Union, 
ILGWU Local 99 
A A-9 50,000.00 Snow Suit, Skiwear, 
Legging & Infants' 
Novelty Wear Workers' 
Union, ILGWU Local 105 
A A-10 100,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
ILGWU Local 20 – Local 
10 
A A-11 150,000.00 Board of Trustees of Skirt 
and Sportswear 
Retirement Funs 
A A-12 50,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
ILGWU Local 32 – Local 
                                                
145 “Company Order”, Kheel Center Archives, May 1, 1961. 
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10, Retirement Benefits 
Fund 
A A-13 100,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Local 62 – 10, Retirement 
Benefits Fund 
A A-14 75,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Retirement Benefit Fund 
of ILGWU Local 66 
A A-15 100,000.00 Board of Trustees ILGWU 
91 – Local 10 
A A-16 5,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Local 98, ILGWU 
Retirement Benefits Fund 
A A-17 50,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Office and Distribution 
Employees Retirement 
Fund, ILGWU Local 99 
A A-18 20,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Retirement Fund, ILGWU 
Local 102 
A A-19 50,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Retirement Fund of the 
Snow Suit, Skiwear, 
Leggings & Infants' 
Novelty Wear Industry 
A A-20 200,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Amalgamated Ladies 
Garment Cutter Union, 
ILGWU Local 10 
A A-21 50,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Health and Welfare Fund, 
Skirt & Sportswear 
Workers' Union, ILGWU 
Local 23 
A A-22 50,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Bonnaz, Embroideries, 
Tucking, Pleating and 
Allied Crafts Union, 
ILGWU Local 66 
A A-23 150,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Health & Welfare Fund, 
ILGWU Local 91 
A A-24 25,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Health Fund, Office and 
Distribution Employees 
Union, ILGWU Local 99 
 116 
A A-25 50,000.00 Board of Trustees of 
Health & Welfare Fund, 
ILGWU 105 Local 
B B-1 300,000.00 Board of Trustees of the 
Northeast Department, 
ILGWU Health & Welfare 
Fund 
C C-1 700,000.00 Chemical Bank New York 
Trust 
C C-2 300,000.00 Dry Dock Savings Bank 
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Table 2: Aggregate Income Rental Surcharge146 
 
Probable Aggregate Annual Income Surcharge Percentage of Basic 
Rent 
In excess of 100% up to 105% of Maximum 
Permissible Income 
Basic Rent 
In excess of 105% up to 110% of Maximum 
Permissible Income 
5.00% 
In excess of 110% up to 115% of Maximum 
Permissible Income 
10.00% 
In excess of 115% up to 120% of Maximum 
Permissible Income 
15.00% 
In excess of 120% up to 125% of Maximum 
Permissible Income 
20.00% 
In excess of 125% up to 130% of Maximum 
Permissible Income 
25.00% 
In excess of 130% up to 135% of Maximum 
Permissible Income 
30.00% 
In excess of 135% up to 140% of Maximum 
Permissible Income 
35.00% 
In excess of 140% up to 145% of Maximum 
Permissible Income 
40.00% 
In excess of 145% up to 150% of Maximum 
Permissible Income 
45.00% 
In excess of 150% 50.00% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
146 “Penn Station South Proposed Amendatory Provisions in Redevelopment Agreement Relation to 
Tenant Income Limitations,” Irving J. Alter to Louis Stulberg, August 2, 1962, ILGWU Collection, 
Kheel Center Archives, Cornell University. 
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Table 3: Balance Sheet of Assets147 
Mutual Redevelopment House Inc. Balance Sheet  
September 30, 1964 
Assets 
Land, Buildings & Equipment $42,849,742.00 
Accumulated Depreciation 1,481,899.00 
Net Fixed Assets 41,367,843.00 
Current Assets 
Cash in Bank and on Hand 86,454.00 
Receivable Tenant Cooperators 25,367.00 
Receivable Tenant Commercials 25,738.00 
Receivable Tenant Interest 207.00 
Receivable Tenant Other 2,806.00 
Receivable Tenant Inter-company Balance 
(Net) 
1,409.00 
Total Current Assets 141,981.00 
Escrow Deposits 
N.Y. State Teachers Retirement System 50,000.00 
Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. 15,000.00 
City of New York 8,390.00 
New York Telephone Co. 250.00 
Total Escrow Deposits 73,640.00 
Due on Sale of Land 22,923.00 
Security Deposits (Contra) 70,975.00 
Pre-Paid Expenses 
Mortgage Procurement 435,492.00 
Insurance 63,999.00 
Organization Expense 16,302.00 
Fuel Inventory 12,039.00 
Supplies Inventory 5,000.00 
Deferred Repairs 23,648.00 
Painting 3,200.00 
Water  4,597.00 
Other 16,516.00 
Total Prepaid Expenses 580,793.00 
Total Assets 42,258,155.00 
                                                
147 “Meeting of Board of Directors,” Balance Sheet as at September, (1965), 3- 4 
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Liabilities 
Mortgage Payable 33,320,000.00 
Current Liabilities 
Contracts Payable 142,578.00 
Accounts Payable and Accrued Expenses 311,245.00 
Interest Payable 0 
Interest Payable Debenture Bond 61,843.00 
Taxes Payable  371,501.00 
Applicants Deposits 500.00 
City of New York Surcharge Collections 22,613.00 
Total Current Liabilities 910,280.00 
Due to Community Services, Inc. 290,000.00 
Prepaid Rents & Services 16,328.00 
Security Deposits Payable (Contra) 70,975.00 
Income Debentures Payable 1,349,500.00 
Total Liabilities 35,956,083.00 
Shareholders Equity 
Capital Stock 7,375,550.00 
Earned Surplus (Deficit) (1,073,478.00) 
Total Shareholder's Equity 6,302,072.00 
Total Liabilities and Shareholder's Equity 42,458,155.00 
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Table 4: Calendar of Events148 
Calendar of Events 
Program Place Date 
Penn South Garden Club Bus Tour to Delaware Gardens May 1st 
Discussion Group, Current 
Events – Ida Taubkin on 
“Juvenile Delinquency” 
Building  Five, Hobby Room Monday May 10th 
at 8 P. M. 
Penn South B & P Group of 
Hadassah 
Building Seven A Community 
Room 
Monday May 10th 
at 8 P. M. 
Pioneer Women Election of 
Delegates to National 
Conventional- Guest Deborah 
Lapson on Jewish Folk Dance 
Building Nine Community 
Room 
Tuesday May 11th 
at 8 P. M. 
Women's Circle, Branch 1076 
Business Meeting 
Building Nine Headquarters Thursday May 13 
at 8 P. M. 
Emma Lazarus Jewish 
Women's Club Annual 
Mothers Day Luncheon- An 
outstanding mother in the 
Peace Movement in the Peace 
Movement will be honored 
Robert Fulton Community 
Center of Hudson Guild 
Saturday, May 15 
at promptly 12:30 
B'nai B'rith Women H. H. 
Lehman Chapter 1183, 
Regular Meeting followed by 
film-music-talk 
Building Five Hobby Room Wednesday May 
19th at 8 P. M., 
8:45 program 
Penn South Community Club 
Lecture - “100 Years of Jewish 
Culture 
Building Seven Community 
Room 
Friday May 21st at 
8 P. M. 
B'nai B'rith Women H. H. 
Lehman Chapter 1183, 
Chartered Bus trip to Hyde 
Park and Vanderbilt Mansion 
Building Seven Community 
Room 
Saturday May 
22nd 
Penn South Community Club 
Bon Voyage Banquet for Mr. 
& Mrs. Benjamin Young 
Building Seven A Community 
Room 
Sunday May 23 at 
3 P. M. 
B'nai B'rith Men's Lodge “The 
Political Situation in the 
Middle East” with Speaker 
member of the Israeli 
Consulate 
Building Seven A Community 
Room 
Tuesday May 18th 
8:30 P. M. 
Women's American ORT 
Election of officers – Guest 
Speaker: Mrs. Sidney Senzer, 
Building Seven A Community 
Room 
Monday May 24th 
at 8 P. M. 
                                                
148 “Calendar of Events”, Co-op Community News Vol. 3 No. 3, April 1965, 15-16. 
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National Vice-President, ORT 
Penn South Garden Club 
Regular Meeting, Horticultural 
Exhibit  
Building Five Hobby Room Tuesday May 35th 
8 P. M. 
Women's Circle, Penn South 
1076 – Open Membership 
Building Nine Headquarters Thursday May 27 
at 8 P. M. 
General and Community Activities 
Penn South Bridge Group 
duplicate and regular play 
Building Eight A Community 
Room 
Every Wednesday 
at 7:45 P. M. 
The Co-op Dance Club for 
“Over 25”  
Building Two Community 
Room 
Every Saturday 
Evening at 8:30 P. 
M. 
Co-op Social Club Building Ten Community 
Room 
Open every 
afternoon and 
evening 
Co-op Dance Exercise Group Building Eight A Every Tuesday 
evening 7:45 to 
8:45 P.M. 
Workmen's Circle, Branch 
1076 Social, Cultural 
evenings: Tuesday, Thursday 
Building Nine Headquarters Tuesday and 
Thursday 8 P. M. 
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